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ABSTRACT: Claude Lefort’s ‘Dante’s Modernity’ presents a detailed
and highly original interpretation of Dante’s Monarchia. Lefort
casts Dante as the first political thinker with a concept of humanity
defined as the whole of the human race, the first to imagine a uni-
versal society in political terms, and the first to reveal the formative
role of force, of wars and division in the advent of such a political
unity. Tracing the career of Dante’s innovations in the political
thought and praxis of the succeeding centuries, Lefort then shows
howwhat is ‘new’ inDante cannot be separated from its later avatars
— from the varied realizations, distortions, and misapplications
it would inspire at later historical junctures. Any contemporary
realization of the potential inherent in Dante’s innovative idea of
sovereignty would require the project of ‘disentangling’ the links
between universalism, imperialism, and nationalism that have been
instituted in its name.
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Dante’s Modernity
CLAUDE LEFORT
As a poet, Dante is universally known and celebrated, his
name often invoked alongside the names of Virgil and
Homer. Anyone cultured, if called upon to list in limited
number the masterpieces of Western literature, could not
fail tomentionTheDivine Comedy. Is this glory so dazzling
as to have cast a shadow over the figure of the political
philosopher, that is, the author of the Monarchia? This
Dante was without doubt the first to understand the term
humanitas as both the dignity proper to the human being
and the human race taken in its widest sense. He was the
first to imagine a universal political society, subject to a
single authority whose mission was to reveal to all their
citizenship of the same world. He was also the first — un-
afraid of connecting the advent of the Law to the work of
might — to discern the development of universal society
as a result of the divisions, wars, or, in his words, ‘duels’ to
which the claimants to the supreme power in turn devoted
themselves.1 How is it, then, that Dante the philosopher
1 [Translator’s note: Of the word ‘duel’, Prue Shaw writes that ‘“Trial
by combat” seems the least unsatisfactory rendering of duellum in
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is only of interest to medieval historians or to theologians,
and that students of literature, philosophy, or (as we now
say) the human sciences typically reach the end of their
education without ever having heard a word about the
Monarchia, or, if they have, knowing only that this treatise
represents one of the last witnesses of the quarrel between
Papacy and Empire?
Of course, the circumstances in which the text was
written should not be neglected. Dante, we learn, was for
a time closely involved in the public affairs of Florence.
As a prior he was part of the government of the Com-
mune, and falling victim to the conflict between the two
factions which divided the city — the Whites and the
Blacks — he had to go into exile after the victory of the
latter. Then, being excluded from the amnesty from which
most of the Whites benefited, he lost any chance of re-
turning to his homeland.His resentment towards Florence
is vehemently expressed in the Comedy. According to the
most likely hypothesis, he wrote theMonarchia in 1311 in
the context of Henry VII’s descent into Italy with a view
to being crowned emperor in Rome. Dante thought that
Henry would restore order and that Henry alone would
be able to rescue Florence from the formidable control
of the Pope. These hopes placed in the purported heir of
the Roman Empire were as little founded as those that
English’: Dante, Monarchy, ed. and trans. by Prue Shaw (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 53 n. 1. In this matter I follow
Shaw’s lead subsequently, just as all subsequent citations from theMon-
archia are taken fromShaw’s translation. It should be noted that Shaw is
also the editor of the critical Latin edition: Dante Alighieri,Monarchia,
ed. by Prue Shaw, Edizione Nazionale delle opere di Dante Alighieri
a cura della Società Dantesca Italiana, v (Florence: Le Lettere, 2009)
and that both the Latin edition of the Edizione Nazionale and her Eng-
lish translation are now available online: <https://www.danteonline.
it/monarchia> [accessed 5 December 2019].]
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Lorenzo de’ Medici would later inspire in Machiavelli. In
reality, a long time had passed since there had been an
Emperor capable of squaring his ambitionswith hismeans.
Only Frederick II had briefly shown himself able to build
a robustly structured State supported by a legal system
which conferred universal authority upon him; and yet,
under the title of emperor, he never governed more than
the Kingdom of Sicily (which included the south of Italy
and Naples). Nonetheless, however accurate we consider
this depiction to be, it does not give an idea of the aims
which Dante was pursuing in his work. I mentioned Ma-
chiavelli: reading him, knowing about the personality of
Lorenzo matters little; what the writer portrays, on the oc-
casion of the return of a Medici, is the figure of a principe
nuovo. Similarly, the illusions which are imputed to Dante
tell us little about his philosophical project. Henry VII is a
figurehead. Moreover, nowhere in theMonarchia is Henry
named; only Dante’s correspondence reveals who he has
in mind. The true name of the emperor is the name of the
One.2
The Monarchia is not a historical document, it is a
work, anoeuvrewhich is extraordinarily innovative, freshly
so even after the intervening centuries, in spite of its some-
times arid language and its disconcerting succession of
syllogisms.Dante systematically borrows fromthewritings
of important Christian authors, from Saint Augustine to
Saint Thomas. He uses the learning of the latter as a ram-
part against the assaults of the many canonists working for
the Papacy, but he does so in order to cause a breach in
2 [Translator’s note: Lefort poignantly capitalizes crucial terms in ways
that are not always predictable. The translation faithfully reproduces
these capitalizations. Following other translations and secondary lit-
erature, ‘le nom d’Un’ is translated throughout as ‘the name of theOne’
rather than as ‘the name of One’.]
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theology, a breach through which human beings escape
the omnipotence of the Church and even that of religion.
Dante leaves to the priest the task of guiding souls in the
quest for heavenly beatitude. Yet human beings, created by
God and freed fromdogma, are recognizably able to follow
their own aims and to attain earthly happiness, the sign of
which is spiritual peace for each individual, and universal
peace for the human race.
Likewise, Dante places himself under the authority of
paganwriters and takes advantage of the jurists who, them-
selves nourished by the teaching of Aristotle and Roman
law, elaborated the conception of a political community as
a totality inwhich all the parts are subordinated to the same
aim, ruled by the principles ofReason and Justice. Yet again
he does this in order to create, following his own inspira-
tion, the idea of the human race as one civilitas (let us not
be afraid to translate this as civil society). In theMonarchia,
then, we witness two types of borrowing and two forms of
rupture, in order to open up a new path. Étienne Gilson
sheds light on Dante’s intentions as follows:
The only universal community of which the idea
existed at the time was a community essentially
supernatural and religious: the Church, or, if one
prefers, Christendom. Not only had the Church
never thought that there should or could exist a
Humanity unified for the purpose of pursuing a
temporal happiness regarded as its special goal,
but it had, since Augustine’s City of God, discoun-
tenanced the ideal of a unification of all mankind
through the common acceptance of the Christian
faith and under the supreme government of the
Pope. In order, then, to conceive of the possibil-
ity of a universal temporal community, it was ne-
cessary to borrow from the Church its ideal of a
universal Christendom and to secularize it. On the
other hand, it was impossible to secularize this ideal
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without establishing philosophy as the basis of the
universal community of all mankind, subject to the
same monarch and pursuing the same form of hap-
piness in obedience to the same laws.3
It is necessary to stress this point further: the Monarchia
represents neither a synthesis between Christian and pa-
gan thought, nor even merely the imbrication of the con-
cepts of two traditions in the service of the legitimiza-
tion of the Emperor. ‘Secularizing the ideal of a universal
Christendom’ means abandoning the precept of human-
ity’s irremediable fallenness; both the individual and the
whole of humankind are invested with spiritual power.
Dante does more than recover the value of earthly life; he
discovers in this life a plan which surpasses and transfig-
ures the mortal condition. Thomas Aquinas, a committed
reader of Aristotle, had already spoken, as Gilson reminds
us, of ‘the necessity which requires humans to communize
the resources of their individual reason’4 and — attent-
ive to the question of the best form of governance — he
thought that a political society governed by one alone was
the most appropriate model for ensuring the cooperation
of human beings granted reason for their survival. But, be-
sides the fact that he thought only of the government of
a king, he assigned strict limits to such a figure. It is thus
an immense step that Dante takes in bestowing philosoph-
ical meaning on political life. As Gilson notes, such a step
requires Dante to adopt the Aristotelian concept of the
possible intellect.5 By this term it must be understood that
humans are able to gain knowledge of intelligible matters
3 Étienne Gilson, Dante the Philosopher, trans. by David Moore (Lon-
don: Sheed &Ward, 1948), p. 166.
4 Ibid. [translation amended].
5 Ibid., p. 167.
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on the basis of the first principles of Reason imprinted
within them. Discursive knowledge consequently places
humans beneath angels, in whombeing and knowledge are
the same, but allows them to orientate themselves towards
a goal which is proper to them, namely the perfection of
their mortal state.
Nonetheless, Dante gives to this concept of the pos-
sible intellect an entirely new meaning. While, on the one
hand, its operations are still attributed to the human being
taken as an individual — the dignity attributed to both
philosopher and emperor leaves no room for doubt on this
point—, on the other hand its realization requires the par-
ticipation of all humankind, understood in the full exten-
sion of space and time. Dante thus also takes an immense
step beyond the field of ancient philosophy. Aristotle con-
ceived of the ideal city as a restricted community, situated
in a clearly defined space, so that its members would know
each other, either directly or indirectly, with their close-
nessmaking it possible to organize their relations correctly.
Dante gives up the idea of the limits of natural sociabil-
ity; the civil society of the human race includes nations of
different sizes, peoples who do not know each other, who
are exposed to different climates and attached to their par-
ticular customs, and whose unity rests on their common
submission to the jurisdiction of a monarch. For Aristotle,
it was unlikely, though not impossible, that the ideal con-
stitution could become a reality; it depended on chance,
which is to say on an extraordinary convergence of events
not reliant on human will alone. For Dante, universal civil-
itas shows itself in the course of history; the sign of its ad-
vent can be seen in the time of Augustus, and its definitive
institution depends on human will. Consequently, a new
relationship between philosophy and politics emerges. Al-
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though Dante still declares that the contemplative life is
superior to the active life, he suggests that they are in-
timately connected, since the principles of philosophy are
imprinted in the order of the world.
The essay that Ernst Kantorowicz dedicates to the
Monarchia in The King’s Two Bodies contains a very valu-
able warning. This learned and astute critic mentions two
difficulties ‘that no one should think can be passed over
lightly’.6 In short, on every page Dante shows himself to be
so dependent on the knowledge and language of his time
that the reader can easily overlook the ‘slant so new and
so surprising’ that he gives to all the statements that he
has borrowed andmiss his intention and the new solutions
that he offers.7 In one sense, this difficulty is indeed over-
whelming. But, on reflection, we should be less concerned
about failing to grasp the full extent of his borrowings
— through lack of the competences of the historian or
the theologian — or of the use he makes of the debates
about the relations between religion and philosophy. For
in this case our confidence in the vigour of his thought,
or, to use an image dear to Dante, its fecundity, is only
6 [Translator’s note: I have not been able to locate the phrase which
Lefort presents as a quotation fromKantorowicz— ‘dont nul ne devrait
croire qu’il pût venir à bout’ — in either the English text or its French
translation, despite Lefort’s references to both. What Lefort seems to
offer here is a summary of similar statements about the difficulty of
analysing Dante’s work made by Kantorowicz at the start of his chapter
on theMonarchia: especially, the insights that ‘Dante, of course, cannot
easily be labelled at all’ and that ‘every Dante interpretation is bound
to be fragmentary where Dante himself is complex’, as well as the
recognition that ‘the Dante expositor will be tempted far too often to
read into Dante things which Dante neither said nor meant to say’. See
‘Man-Centered Kingship: Dante’, in Ernst H. Kantorowicz,The King’s
Two Bodies: A Study in Mediaeval Political Theology (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1997), pp. 451–95 (pp. 451–53). Lefort’s
subsequent citations from Kantorowicz are, in contrast, accurate.]
7 Kantorowicz,The King’s Two Bodies, pp. 452–53.
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increased. Moreover, the search for the coherence of the
work leads to another risk, that of forgetting that ‘The
visions of Dante the poet seem to interfere constantly with
the logical arguments of Dante the political philosopher’.8
In essence, Kantorowicz tells us that there is nothing linear
in his work; what we find, instead, is a network of corres-
pondences between different themes which borrow from
different areas of knowledge. Undoubtedly, the explora-
tion of such a complex oeuvre is beyond our reach. And
yet, if it is true that the Monarchia eludes an analysis that
would seek to reveal the totality of its articulations, does it
not also encourage an examination of the development of
its thoughts through the variety of its means of expression,
its combination of images, stories, and inflexible demon-
strations in the form of syllogisms, and its quotations from
the Bible and classical texts?
THE HUMAN RACE
The treatise appears to follow a rigorous structure. At the
start of the second section of Book I, Dante defines the
temporal monarchy known as Empire and announces the
three questions he intends to answer and which will be
treated in each of the three books: whether this monarchy
is necessary for the good of the world; whether the Ro-
man people rightfully claimed for themselves the office of
the monarchy; whether the authority of the monarch de-
pends on God directly or on another, a minister or vicar
of God (I, ii, 3). But how can we prepare ourselves to fol-
low Dante through the twists and turns of his argument,
if we have not first taken the measure of his undertak-
ing? In the theatre where the fate of these questions is
8 Ibid., p. 453.
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to be decided, Dante places a number of protagonists:
namely, Christ andCaesar Augustus,Moses, Aristotle, Vir-
gil, and Thomas Aquinas, the Pope, the Emperor, earlier
claimants to the supreme power, and Rome. He lets the
Bible and philosophy speak, but he puts himself on stage
first and foremost. This fact can even less be overlooked
since, throughout the treatise, the persistence of his pres-
ence makes itself felt in the repeated use of the first person
and in the exercise of a singular voice. Of course, this voice
protects itself through the authority ofwritingorbyfinding
its guarantee in bearing witness to facts, yet it still assumes
the burden of proof or of condemnation both of error and
of deceit.
Hence, Book I opens with a sort of prologue (I, i,
1–6). Dante places himself among those ‘men whom the
Higher Nature has endowed with a love of truth’ (I, i, 1).
This group comprises those — as Dante demonstrated in
the Convivio — who deserve to be called noble, in con-
trast to thosewho have inherited titles from their ancestors
or from their wealth. Those enamoured with truth have
quite a different notion of what they inherit and what they
pass on. They benefit from the work of the ancients who
have enriched them, and it is their duty to enrich posterity
in their own turn. From the ancients they received pub-
lic instruction and their concern is precisely with matters
of public interest. Hence, right at the outset, there is the
sense of a shared, unifying purpose bringing generations
together, necessitating human cooperation across time in
the service of a quest for truth, for a common good. The
novelty of this argument should not be underestimated.
In one breath Dante acknowledges his debt towards those
who have passed their knowledge on to him and his debt
towards those who will need his own knowledge in the
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future. Then, evoking the image — taken from one of the
psalms — of ‘“a tree planted by the rivers of water, that
bringeth forth his fruit in due season”’,9 he suggests that his
thoughts have ripened at the appropriate hour. Had he not
already stated in the Convivio that ‘we must consider how
it is appropriate to wait for the right time in all our activit-
ies and especially in speech’, shortly thereafter adding that
‘timing must be taken into account, for both speaker and
listener’?10 To be sure, in the ConvivioDante is comment-
ing on his own poems; in the Monarchia, by contrast, we
can assume he is thinking instead of the present time of the
world. His intention is not only to stigmatize those who
merely devour what they learn (likely an allusion to the
intellectual servility of the theologians); rather, he wants
to discover ‘truths that have not been attempted by others’
(I, i, 3). To the sterility of those who do nothing but re-
gurgitate the lessons of the ancients, he opposes the desire
to innovate, for it is useless to repeat the words of Euclid,
Aristotle, or Cicero. Now, this last statement makes fully
evident the extent of what humanism will owe to Dante’s
audacity. The message is that studying great thinkers and
respecting their authority goes hand in hand with the de-
9 Dante,Monarchy, I, i, 2. [Translator’s note: Shaw cites from the Bible
in the Authorized Version [AV], save in cases ‘Where the English of
the AV does not correspond to the Latin quoted by Dante, or blurs
the development of his argument, or cannot be accommodated syn-
tactically’ (‘Editor’s note’, inMonarchy, pp. xxxv–xxxvii (p. xxxvi)).The
original of this quotation of Psalm 1, v. 3 has ‘his season’ rather than
‘due season’.]
10 Dante, Convivio, IV, ii, 5 and 8.The discussion of the nature of nobility
is found in Book IV, especially IV, vii, 9 and IV, viii, 9 (and, on the
Emperor’s inability to grant nobility, IV, x, 16). [Translator’s note:
Dante Alighieri, Convivio: A Dual-Language Critical Edition, ed. and
trans. by Andrew Frisardi (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2018), p. 221. All subsequent translations from the Convivio are taken
from this edition.]
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sire to find in them a call to create new works. Imitation
is thus based on the principle of non-repetition. What is
herebeing formulated, I believe for thefirst time, is nothing
less than the modern idea of the oeuvre. The end of the
prologue is also remarkable. By declaring that he wants
to bring to light the truth of the universal Monarchy, all
the while pointing out once more that no one before him
had discovered it, Dante announces his hope of winning,
for his own glory, first prize in such a great contest. That
the treatise should include a disputatio is hardly surprising,
but the stakes of the confrontation are presented in such
a way that the reader will later lend credence to the ana-
logy betweenDante’s position in the intellectual arena and
Rome’s position in the arena of the world.
It is thus at the end of this prologue that Dante defines
‘Temporal monarchy, then, which men call “empire”’ as
‘a single sovereign authority set over all others in time,
that is to say over all authorities which operate in those
things and over those things which are measured by time’
(I, ii, 2).Then he states his three questions. Before answer-
ing them, however, he takes care to explain their origin.
Humans have the ability to think speculatively, to pene-
trate the knowledge of intelligible beings which do not
depend on their power — namely, mathematics, physics,
and divine matters —, but they also have the ability to
turn their speculative thoughts towards action, to reason
about matters over which their will does have power. In
essence: the questions which Dante raises belong to the
domain of political philosophy, the aim of which is to es-
tablish the principle of legitimate constitutions. Political
philosophy does not attempt to determine the purpose of
this or that particular society, but rather the ultimate end
of life in society, bearing inmind that this ultimate purpose
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merges with the first cause of this life, which is the cause of
everything, that is, the cause of all human actions. Hence,
we find Dante abruptly declaring:
whatever constitutes thepurposeof the civil society
of the human race […] will be here the first prin-
ciple, in terms of which all subsequent propositions
to be proved will be demonstrated with sufficient
rigour; for it would be foolish to suppose that there
is one purpose for this society and another for that,
and not a common purpose for all of them. (I, ii, 8
[translation amended])
In these few lines, the breakwithAristotle is accomplished,
producing a reformulation of the opposition between the
particular and the universal. But for Dante, who is certainly
aware of Aristotle’s intention, it is important that this break
remain implicit. To be sure, the author of the Politics does
not, in fact, conceive of an end which would be specific
to each type of society; as we saw, he is fully convinced
that life in society derives from a single principle, that,
consequently, there exists a constitution true to nature and
reason (which are one and the same). However, that is
the extent of this constitution’s universality; it can only
be realized in the space of the city. Dante introduces the
idea of a new kind of universality: the end or the universal
cause belongs to humanity understood as the whole of
humankind.
In short, the exploration of the question already re-
veals the answer. Nonetheless, though the answer may be
indicated, it still calls for an explanation of why humanity
contains in itself its own end, while being part of a much
larger whole, and why it must be led by one alone. Let us
first consider two arguments, both of which draw on Aris-
totle. The first relies on the metaphor of the body: nature
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produces the thumb for one end, the hand for another, the
arm for yet another, and, finally, it is for an entirely differ-
ent end that the whole being is created.The political body
is conceived according to the same model; the individual,
the family, the town, the city, and the kingdom all have
their own specific ends, and all these ends are subordinate
to the end for which the human race was created (I, iii, 1–
2). Making use of the phrase ‘nature does nothing in vain’
(God being here conflated with Nature), Dante points out
that things are defined not by their essence but by what
they do. Thus it seems that there is an activity that cannot
be imputed to any of the particular bodies, and that alone is
universal, and belongs to humanity. Ostensibly remaining
within the framework of classical philosophy, but not hesi-
tating to transgress its doctrine, Dante recalls that humans
differ from animals not only in their sensitivity to things
with which they come into contact, but also in their ability
to conceive of these things through the possible intellect, in
order to conclude that the ultimate end of humanity is the
intellective power or virtue. It is at this point that Dante
puts forward the following extraordinary proposition:
And since that potentiality cannot be fully actual-
ized all at once in any one individual or in any one
of the particular social groupings […], there must
needs be a vast number of individual people in the
human race, through whom the whole of this po-
tentiality can be actualized. (I, iii, 8)
Despite the reference to Averroes at this point, it is clear
that the possible intellect does not refer to a substance
which is separate from the body. But this observation,
which I take from Gilson, is not sufficient.11 The intellect
11 Gilson, Dante the Philosopher, pp. 169–71.
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does seem to have a relation with the body of humanity,
a body composed of many members which coexist while
also succeeding each other in time. Of course, Dante does
not state this explicitly, but it must surely be understood
that speculation and speculation with a view to action —
philosophy and political philosophy— are involved in the
condition of the human race and caught up in its history.
Dante, let us note in passing, immediately signals that by
the term intellective power he understands the speculative
intellect and the practical intellect which is but an exten-
sion of the former. At this point ought we not to remember
his prologue? If he could set his sights on the discovery of
truths heretofore entirely unknown, was this not because
he knew how to take advantage of the support of classical
thinkers and also how to draw on new resources in the
present state of the world?
The first argument can be presented summarily. Suf-
fice it to indicate that the lengthy considerations concern-
ing the analogy of the whole and the part, the relationships
of the parts to one another, then the supremacy of the
whole, and, finally, the necessity of one principle govern-
ing the whole, lead to the conclusion that the human race
requires a single monarch. In the course of these consid-
erations emerges the important theme of universal peace
(which will accompany that of unity until the end). The
second argument is based on the authority of the Bible. It
is summed up in the following few lines:
It is God’s intention that every created thing should
show forth His likeness in so far as its own nature
can receive it. For this reason it is said: ‘Let usmake
man in our image, after our likeness’; for although
‘in our image’ cannot be said of things lower than
man, ‘after our likeness’ can be said of anything,
since the whole universe is simply an imprint of
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divine goodness. So mankind is in a good (indeed,
ideal) state when, to the extent that its nature al-
lows, it resembles God. But mankind most closely
resembles God when it is most a unity, since the
true measure of unity is in him alone; and for this
reason it iswritten: ‘Hear, o Israel, theLord thyGod
is one.’ Butmankind ismost a unitywhen it is drawn
together to form a single entity, and this can only
come about when it is ruled as one whole by one
ruler, as is self-evident. (I, viii, 2–4)
Theway in which Dante here interprets the teaching of the
Bible is no less new and surprising, to return to Kantoro-
wicz’s terms, thanhis treatment of the teaching ofAristotle.
Thehumanbeing asGod’s creature is equatedwith human-
ity. The idea of humanity is no longer supported by the
image of the political body— family, village, city, kingdom
— as understood by the philosopher, but rather by the
image of Adam’s body. Reasoning based on the analogy of
the part with the whole or on the subordination of the part
to the whole is replaced by the mystical identification of
thehuman racewithmanunderstood inhis first perfection.
Although already present previously, the thought of the one
proves to be more profound than that of the whole. Like-
wise, the function of themonarch no longer stems asmuch
from the need for a principle governing the whole and for
an agent able to render this principle effective, as from the
need for a body the sight of which assures humankind of
its own form and identity.
This brief examination of the first two arguments re-
veals much about the way in which Dante proceeds. Kan-
torowicz said that there was nothing linear in Dante’s
thought; in fact, he follows a path which he then aban-
dons once he has reached his goal. When the answer to a
question seems to have been given, he starts out on a new
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path in the direction of the same goal. The first route con-
tains signs which point to the second exploration, while
traces of the former remain discernible in the latter. In
order to establish that the world is in the best possible
condition when it experiences peace and concord under
the authority of one alone, Dante relies first on philosophy
and then on Scriptures; he places reason as the first prin-
ciple, and then divine will. Witnessing this approach, we
are tempted to ask what is meant by the new bifurcation
demonstrated by his considerations about judgement. In
effect, without any transition, he declares that wherever
there is disagreement, there must there also be judgement
(I, x, 1).The change in direction is at first glance evenmore
surprising than the preceding one. Summarized succinctly,
his third argument will be as follows: two lords who are in
disagreement need to call upon a third party, of a higher
jurisdiction, in order to resolve their differences. However,
if this third party has only limited authority, their decision
risks being contested by another who has equal powers
of jurisdiction. Thus recourse to a new third party proves
necessary, and the process would be endless were there
not a sovereign judge against whom none can be opposed.
Whence the need for a universal monarch, for a third party
who is absolutely other.
This reasoning seems to follow a formal logic. How-
ever, it proceeds from an idea which remains implicit:
divisions between people are not brute divisions result-
ing from their natural separation and which, in this sense,
have no other outcome than war and the domination of
the weak by the strong. In a dispute, each party is in fact
within its rights in asserting itself, and wants to have these
rights recognized. Thus the requirements for there to be
a universal monarch ensue from the fact that every indi-
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vidual, regardless of motives, has an idea of right. Let us
be in no doubt that the reference to Aristotle at the end
of the passage mentioned (I, x, 6) has no other purpose
than to persuade us that the path taken coincides with
that of philosophy. At this point, it is worth noting that
the words attributed to Aristotle referred, in the Politics
(IV, 4), to a verse from Homer, the meaning of which ap-
peared to Aristotle unclear: ‘No good thing is a multitude
of lords’ (Iliad, ii, v. 204).12 Dante, rather than evoking
Homer, refers to Virgil. It is Virgil who is credited with
having shown that the world is in its best state when justice
rules over it. Dante cites from the Bucolics the following
verse,well knownat the time: ‘“Now theVirgin returns, the
reign of Saturn returns”’, explaining that Virgil addressed
Justice as theVirgin, also namedAstraea, and that the reign
of Saturn indicated the golden age (I, xi, 1). For centur-
ies, Christian authors had favoured Virgil, either because
they saw in him a poet who, despite his paganism, evinced
the highest moral virtues, or because they interpreted his
poems in an allegorical manner, more specifically finding
in the Fourth Eclogue a sign of the coming of Christ on
earth.13 Dante is therefore no more innovative in calling
upon Virgil than in invoking Aristotle. However, it is ne-
cessary to consider that here a new authority does appear,
12 [Translator’s note: citing here from Homer, Iliad, ed. and trans. by A.
T. Murray, rev. byWilliam F. Wyatt, 2 vols, Loeb Classical Library, 170
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), i, p. 77.]
13 ‘Virgile philosophe et prophète’, in Henri de Lubac, Exégèse médiévale:
les quatre sens de l’Écriture, 2 vols in 4 (Paris: Aubier, 1959–64), ii.2,
pp. 233–62. This chapter provides important information about inter-
pretations of Virgil since the sixth century, notably with regard to the
fate of the Fourth Eclogue and to the verse cited by Dante. [Translator’s
note: the last volume of this work has yet to be translated into English,
although for the earlier volumes seeHenri de Lubac,Medieval Exegesis:
TheFour Senses of Scripture, trans. byMark Sebanc andE.M.Macierow-
ski, 3 vols (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1998–2009).]
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following the authority of Aristotle and of Christ (or of
the Evangelists), and that this new authority enablesDante
to introduce a new principle, in concert with Reason and
Revelation: Justice. Having understood Dante’s intention,
we are no longer in any doubt that his considerations about
disputes and judgement are undertaken in order to reach
the same goal by another route. In effect, it is not so much
the demonstration of the necessity of a sovereign judge
which now seems to be most important, but rather the
relationship established between the ideas of justice and of
omnipotence, heralded by the reunion of Astraea and the
Emperor.
Of justice it is said both that it is immaterial (an un-
changing essence which, like whiteness, knows no differ-
ence of degree, or else a divinity, such as Astraea) and
that it radiates through the souls of mortals, who are sus-
ceptible of receiving this light to a greater or lesser degree,
depending on the extent to which they are blinded by their
covetousness and able to exert their own will. Now, what
man is freed from his desires and capable of allowing him-
self to be wholly animated by justice, so that nothing in his
soul can hinder it? This man is quite evidently someone
who has no rival and therefore no reason to be envious.
And this man exists; it is the Emperor. In this manner, the
reasoning has been reversed. The necessity of a universal
monarch is no longer based on the demand of those who
seek a judge above them and, in the end, above everyone.
Instead, this necessity comes, if I dare put it like this, from
on high, from a transcendent justice which requires, in or-
der to be passed on to humans, a minister or vicar who
can be, by virtue of his position, completely free of ani-
mosity. Moreover, the question whether there exists a lord
capable of imposing his decrees is once more answered
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in the affirmative, namely that he is the one who, beyond
the borders of cities and kingdoms, possesses a power of
commandment which none can oppose: the Emperor.
Although the demonstration is developed on Virgil’s
authority, it is probable that the Bucolics are not Dante’s
only source of inspiration. He may have been guided in
part by the work of Frederick II’s jurists. It is known that
a veritable cult of Justice, combined with that of the Em-
peror, was established under Frederick’s reign. The Liber
augustalis formulated a theory of juridico-centric royalty.
Most notably, it declared that by virtue of the Lex regia, the
Quirites had:
conferred on the Roman Prince both the right to
legislate and the imperium […]. Provision, there-
fore, was made for reasons of utility and necessity
[…] that there concur in the selfsame person the
origin as well as the protection of Justice, lest Vigor
be failing Justice, and Justice, Vigor.14
However, assuming that Dante made use of this concep-
tion, it must be admitted that he deduces from it con-
sequences that are quite extreme:
where there is nothing which can be coveted, it is
impossible for greed to exist, for emotions cannot
exist where their objects have been destroyed. But
there is nothing the monarch could covet, for his
jurisdiction is bounded only by the ocean. (I, xi,
11–12)
Themanner in which he develops his apology of omnipo-
tence, by invoking Aristotle and proliferating syllogisms,
14 Kantorowicz, The King’s Two Bodies, pp. 98–99, citing from a section
on ‘Frederick the Second’, pp. 97–143.
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is no less remarkable. He returns to the author of the
Nicomachean Ethics in order to establish the thesis that the
being who is most perfect is the most whole and to refor-
mulate the idea of the unity of the human race by turning
to the idea of the unity of wills (I, xv, 1–5).
Yet it is more important to notice the use that Dante
makes of Scriptures. Already, in a passage where he takes
care to explain that the exercise of omnipotence does not
entail uniform legislation, the example of Moses is in-
voked. It was to him that judgements of a higher order
concerning all the children of Israel were entrusted; how-
ever, he entrusted lower-order judgements to the heads of
the tribes, in other words the initiative to apply the law in
the particular context of their community (I, xiv, 9). But
it is in the last part of Book I that Dante draws from the
circumstances surrounding the birth of Christ the ultimate
proof of the legitimacy of the Empire:
All the arguments advanced so far are confirmed
by a remarkable historical fact: namely the state of
humanity which the Son of God either awaited, or
himself chose to bring about, when he was on the
point of becoming man for the salvation of man-
kind. For if we review the ages and the dispositions
of men from the fall of our first parents (which was
the turning-point atwhichwewent astray), we shall
not find that there ever was peace throughout the
world except under the immortal Augustus, when a
perfect monarchy existed. (I, xvi, 1)
What Dante wants to express is not wholly explicit in this
passage. Admittedly, he already calls Augustus a divine
monarch and sees in the apparition of the SonofGodunder
Augustus’s reign a sign of the latter’s glory. However, it is
not until the endofBook II that his intentionbecomes fully
clear. At that point, he leaves no doubt as toChrist’s choice
CLAUDE LEFORT 21
to be born ‘under an edict emanating from Roman author-
ity, so that the Son of God made man might be enrolled as
a man in that unique census of the human race’ (II, x, 6).
The edict was therefore just, and Augustus was the agent
of God, when, through his census, he made manifest that
all mortal beings belong to one same community. Dante
goes so far as to maintain that Adam’s sin would not have
been punished in Christ had the empire not been founded
in all due right. He even derives an argument from the fact
that the judgement was made not by Herod, a mere king,
but by Pilate, an imperial vicar. Doubtless, others before
Dante had associated the coming ofChrist with the univer-
sal census, but he truly seems to transgress the boundaries
of the tradition by attributing a sacred mission to Caesar
and absolute legitimacy to the Empire.
ROME AND THE HISTORY OF HUMANITY
I have just mentioned the concept of legitimacy. As will be
recalled, the first question concerning the necessity of the
monarch for the good of humankind was to be followed by
a second question concerning the legitimacy of theRoman
emperor. Can the two questions be separated? Does the
answer to the first not resolve the second? Probably, but
it seems that Dante’s aim at this point is to show that the
history of Rome bears witness to its vocation to include all
people and that, as a consequence, whoever appears as its
heir holds the legitimacy whose principle was previously
established. In committing to this approach, Dante again
shows how innovative he is, and it is surprising that critics
as insightful as Gilson andKantorowicz show little interest
in Book II.
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In fact, Dante audaciously combines the interpreta-
tion of the signs which confirm the nobility of Rome (its
genealogy, the virtues of its assemblies and citizens) with
the interpretation of the signs which confirm its chosen
status (the miraculous events which allowed it to escape
destruction). This twofold reading of the history of Rome
teaches not that right belongs to the most powerful, but
that it is revealed in the work of might. Moreover, the di-
visions between people, cities, and kingdoms, which we
had learnt are the cause of humanity’s misfortune, appear
in a new light. These divisions have become empty, but it
is through their effect that the human race has achieved
unity. Let us note in passing that once more Dante dis-
tances himself from Aristotle’s teaching. According to the
Politics, a well-ordered city cannot have conquest as its
aim; the care that it affords to its military organization
results only from the need to resist an eventual attacker
or to discourage any thoughts of aggression. It is, for ex-
ample, for this reason that the principal vice of Sparta is
visible in the essential part accorded in its education to
learning skills of weaponry. In contrast, Dante believes that
conflict between powers seeking to establish their suprem-
acy, providing that it obeys the rules of honour, as in trial
by combat, concerns the fate of humanity. Thus rivalries
which appeared a little earlier as contrary to theworkingsof
Justice acquire newmeaning. In the past, these rivalries had
a beneficial function, as they served the establishment of
peace and concord, albeit unbeknownst to those involved.
Right has gradually triumphed over the desire for power.
Such is the argument that a distinction is outlined between
subjective and objective right. What confers legitimacy on
the victor is not their intentions, but the result of their
action, as they will appear in retrospect to have taken a
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step forward in the path followed by humanity towards its
ultimate aim.
Dante does not overturn his first argument: wherever
there is disagreement, a judge is necessary, he argued, then
a higher judge, then another still higher, unless there is
a monarch above whom there is no one. Rather, this ar-
gument finds itself confirmed in the reading of history.
Conflicts between claimants to the Empire similarly re-
quired the advent of a sovereign judge, who finally appears
with the figure of Rome. Dante thus finds a new way to
bring out from the shadows where it was hidden the truth
of the universalMonarchy. Everyone had beenmade blind,
and, he notes, he himself had been momentarily blinded,
by the dazzle of weapons, while what was needed was to
discover what was at stake in the coming of justice and
reason. At this point, we are once more reminded of his
prologue. Dante, as I was remarking, embarks on a cam-
paign against his adversaries: supporters of the Papacy, as
Book III will demonstrate. Again we need to ask ourselves
whether, by announcing his hope of winning the prize in
such an important contest, he is not seeking to prevail over
the Philosopher whose heir he claims to be. Whatever the
case, Dante’s ambition cannot be underestimated. Nor the
fact that he puts forward a principle on which the modern
philosophy of history will be founded. The idea of a rela-
tionship between right and might which is only able to be
deciphered upon examination of the events, and of a final
state in which the entire meaning of the past is revealed,
will return with certain nineteenth-century thinkers. The
anticipation even of the theory of the cunning of Reason can
hardly be doubted, since the interpretation of the major
events of the past entails the discovery of a meaning which
is written in reverse.
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Yet it is true that this interpretation is accompanied
throughout by explicit recourse to theology. While he
brings the register of a purely human history to the fore,
Dante asserts that we must nonetheless read in the succes-
sion of key events which marks this history the traces of
God’s intention. From the start of the Book (II, ii, 4), he
declares that ‘right is willed byGod’. Consequently, consid-
ering whether something has been accomplished by right
means also considering whether it is accomplished by God.
Only ignorance and sin are the work of human beings; it
is enough for many events to be unworthy of our interest.
Just as Reason is not discernible in the detail of facts, and it
must suffice to grasp the sequence of conflicts where what
matters is supreme power, so likewise are the designs of
Providencehidden, yet its intervention cannotbedoubted,
considering the happy dénouement which results from the
gathering of all people under the authority of a singlemon-
arch.
Let us return to the role attributed to Rome in this
second Book. Rome appears as the agent that gives sense
to the whole of history. Rome is the nation which has
accomplished the promise contained in the struggles for
world domination. Rome’s success marks, in a way, a sort
of end of History, since the divisions of the princes are no
longer a factor of right and reason, and, in a way, the start
of History, since humanity is now able to know its proper
task, even if it hesitates before its accomplishment. Listen-
ing to Dante, it would seem that in order for the world
to live in peace, it is sufficient for people to recognize the
figureof sovereign authority in theonewhobears thename
of Emperor, successor of Caesar. Nothing in his treatise
suggests that war remains necessary in order to assert the
Emperor’s rights. Dante knows, however, the turbulence
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of the world in which he lives. His silence regarding the
means of restoring the power of the emperor stems from
his interpretation of history: war no longer makes sense.
A simple yes to that which is would be the salvation of the
peoples. In other words, Rome is the chosen nation and
its heir forever benefits from this choice, since nobody can
undo what God has ordained.
Whywas it legitimate for theRoman people to assume
the office of theMonarchy?This is the question which was
announced at the start of the work. The exploration that
this question calls for is no less extensive in the second
Book than in the first. Effectively, we had understood the
principle of the response, but it is worth noting that the
answer is given in two different moments. In the second
part of the text, Rome is presented as the last protagonist
of the drama, as the one who was victorious in the final
trial and who has reached the goal of sovereignty over all
mortals. Quite extraordinary is the scene in which Dante
deploys the pretenders to the Empire: Ninus, king of the
Assyrians; Vesoges, king of Egypt; Cyrus, king of the Per-
sians; then Xerxes, son of Darius; finally Alexander, king of
Macedonia. All these were unable to win the competition
up until the appearance of Rome who, in trial by com-
bat, eliminated the Albans, the Sabines, the Samnites, the
Greeks, and the Carthaginians. Each time, the disagree-
ment was resolved by the sword. And right was victorious,
as is demonstrated, in the conclusion that we have already
mentioned, in Christ’s choice to take the form of man dur-
ing the reign of Augustus.
But the catalogue of Rome’s virtues, to which the first
part of the text is devoted, seems to me no less worthy of
attention. Dante invokes Rome’s nobility, taking care to
recall that, according to the teaching of the Philosopher,
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‘“nobility is virtue and ancient wealth”’ (II, iii, 4). In this
way Dante prepares his readers to receive the legend of the
foundation of Rome, without letting them forget that the
greatness of its ancestors is only to Rome’s credit because
their descendants were able to preserve the traces of this
greatness. He notes that ancestral and personal nobility are
not the same thing. The distinction is, indeed, important,
and in the Convivio Dante had devoted to it a lengthy dis-
cussion whichmakes it impossible to doubt his opposition
to aristocratic ethics; aman’s dignity has nothing todowith
his ancestry, for virtue is not passed on through nature. It is
equally impossible to think that it is in the emperor’s power
to confer nobility on any of his subjects (Convivio IV, ix,
16). We must therefore be careful not to mistake Dante’s
intentions in theMonarchia. This supporter of empire sees
people through the eyes of a citizen of Florence, that is,
of a commune which managed to destroy the power of
nobles, and this in combats in which he himself participa-
ted. Doubtless, Dante is conservative, in the sense that he
defends the prerogatives of Florentines of ancient lineage
and is opposed to the political rise to power of immigrants
coming from the Contado. Thus he feels free to borrow
the story of the Aeneid without any risk of suspicion. In
any case, at this point he is still only following tradition.
His apology of Roman citizens will be quite different in
import. However, obedient to a pattern which is by now
familiar to the reader, Dante interrupts his discussion of
nobility in order to introduce a theological argument, all
the while juxtaposing Aristotle, Virgil, Lucan, and Saint
Thomas. Under the authority of this last, he declares that
‘whatever is brought to full realization with the aid of mir-
acles is willed by God, and consequently comes about by
right’ (II, iv, 1). At this point, the signs of a providential
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history of Rome appear: the shield that fell from heaven in
the timeofNuma; the interventionof the goose in theCap-
itol; the hailstorm which put the Carthaginians to flight;
the flight of Cloelia during the siege of Porsenna. All these
examples prove that the Roman Empire moving towards
its perfection was supported by the attestation of miracles
(II, iv, 4–11).
Having proved as much in brief, the author shows, at
length, why it was Rome’s vocation to reign over theworld.
Themain idea is that Rome’s destiny is evident in the sense
of right and in the sense of common weal demonstrated
by its assemblies and by its citizens. In this manner the
strict submission and, if necessary, the sacrifice of private
interest to the common good is perceived as the sign —
clear, though not miraculous — of Rome’s chosen status.
Undoubtedly, at one point Dante goes so far as to grant
the Romans a love of justice and peace, and to attribute
to them, against all likelihood, concern for the salvation
of the human race. But this idealized picture, and Dante’s
use of passages from Cicero, should not make us lose sight
of his theologico-political argument: any one person’s self-
effacement in front of the City, or promptness to die for
one’s country, demonstrates the principle that the whole
is more important than the part. In this regard, there is
no need to call upon providence to understand this truth.
As the conclusion to the passage in question states: ‘there
are some judgements of God which human reason can
arrive at by its own unaided efforts’ (II, vii, 2). Dante relies
on Aristotle again, but he introduces a new element; the
logic is embedded in the life of a people, whose members
have, in a way, incorporated the need to abandon their
particularity in favour of that which alone has full dignity:
the community. It is therefore not enough to acknowledge,
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through the workings of the intellect, that neither thumb,
hand, nor arm have their end in themselves, and that the
same is true of family, village, city, and kingdom. Itmust be
understood that Roman citizens have in a way interiorized
nature’s design, that they give themselves to thewhole, and
that in this way they prove to be potential citizens of the
human race.
As commentators of theMonarchia point out, Dante’s
thinkingwas partly formed through contactwith the teach-
ings of the jurists of his day. Kantorowicz, in particular,
notes that Dante’s teacher, Remigio de’ Girolami — him-
self a student ofThomas—was not satisfied with teaching
that the whole is alone in actuality, while the part is in
potentiality, and so citizens should love their countrymore
than themselves. Remigio was not afraid to argue that if a
man’s city were destroyed that person would lose both his
status as a citizen and his status as aman. Kantorowicz tells
us that Remigio, that ‘curious thomistic proto-Hegelian,
was an extremist of anti-individualism’.15 Yet the picture
that Dante paints of the great Roman citizens stems from a
different source of inspiration. It is in Livy that Dante finds
the examples of individuals whose actions are to the glory
of Rome, because they always bear the marks of devotion
to the common good and of personal nobility. Livy’s work
had certainly been known to a small number of scholars for
centuries, but Dante’s use of it is no less striking because
of that. Cincinnatus, Fabritius, Camillus, the first Brutus,
the two Decii, and Cato are all figures in whom Roman
virtue can be discerned—the virtue, that is, of an active life
spent serving one’s country and freedom. It is impossible,
moreover, not to notice that Dante celebrates the heroes
of the ‘Republic’. Of course, he is following Livy. But, since
15 Kantorowicz,The King’s Two Bodies, p. 479.
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his aim is to prove the benefits of universal monarchy, it is
surprising that he does not even mention Caesar, and that,
instead, he describes Cato as ‘the most stern guardian of
liberty’ (II, v, 15). Cato, whomDante had already admired
in theComedy, had voluntarily killed himself on hearing of
Caesar’s victory. Note that this paradox was to attract the
attention of the Florentine humanists who, at the end of
the Trecento, asserted the excellence of the Republic and
argued amongst themselves over how to interpret Dante’s
thought. Compared to the praise of Cato, the condemna-
tion of Brutus, buried deep in Hell by the author of the
Comedy, was able to be presented as of a purely symbolic
order,withCaesar’smurderer paling under the figure of the
transgressor who attacked the universal monarchy. How-
ever strange this version of Brutus’s conduct might seem,
it is not, after all, implausible, since Dante himself calls for
a distinction between the symbolic and literal meanings of
the Comedy.
What is certain, if we stick to the Monarchia, is that
its author wants to reproduce the genesis of the Empire
and show that the seeds of the truth which occurred in
the time of Augustus had been sown at Rome’s beginnings
and had been constantly growing throughout the course of
its history, both in the organization of its institutions and
in the actions of its players. This intention signals a break
with Aristotle. Contradicting what had been suggested in
Book I, the taskof political philosophy is not todefinegood
constitutions or weigh the merits of different systems of
government, but rather to discover the progress of reason
and right. This does not mean that observing the course
of events is sufficient to appreciate this progress; the past
only becomes clear for someone who knows the concepts
of reason and right. However, this knowledge is itself not
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purely atemporal. Aristotelian knowledge remains unsur-
passable, insofar as it is fundamental, but the work of the
intellect and the explanation of the founding principles
benefit from the experience of humanity.
THE TWO SOVEREIGNTIES
Does the authority of the Monarch derive directly from
God or from another, a minister or vicar of God? Just as
the principle of the answer to the question posed in the
second Book could be found in the first Book, so the ques-
tion raised in the third Book has already been resolved by
the end of the second Book. But it is important for the
question tobe examinedclosely for its political significance
and for how topical it remains. Dante, then, undertakes
a refutation of the arguments of his adversaries. He be-
stows a singular philosophical breadth on this undertaking
and, once more, discovers truths which no one had yet ex-
plored. The supporters of the thesis that he wants to over-
turn fall into three categories: firstly, the Supreme Pontiff
and, in his wake, other shepherds of the Christian flock;
secondly, those who, motivated by their cupidity, falsely
proclaim their love for the Church and hate the very name
of emperor; thirdly, the followers of a tradition which has
been reduced to fidelity to the Decretals, as a result of a
double ignorance of both theology and philosophy.Does it
not seemas ifDante, like one of his Romanheroes,Horace,
separates and isolates his adversaries so that he is able to
defeat them by three successive trials by combat? To tell
the truth, the second category hardly interests him at all.
As for the decretalists, he counters that their sources are
late and cannot have the same value as either the Old and
theNewTestaments, which preceded the establishment of
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theChurch, or the synods,which accompanied its early de-
velopment. His true adversaries are the defenders (said to
be in good faith) of the Church and of pontifical authority.
These he will hunt down in every way possible.
For example, he objects that it is not true that the sun
and moon represent spiritual and temporal power, since
the Book of Genesis teaches that both were created on the
fourth day and man on the sixth, and if God’s creature had
remained in his perfect state, government would have been
unnecessary. It is, equally, not true that the fact thatMoses
conferred spiritual power upon Levi before Judas received
temporal power can be used as an argument in favour of
the latter being subject to the former, for this would mean
confusing the question of birth with that of authority. Nor
is it true that Christ’s double sovereignty can justify that
of the Pope, since the Son of God never wanted to wield
temporal power and,moreover, a vicar only ever represents
his lord, whoever hemay be, and is never equal to him.Nor
is it even true that the image of the two swords signifies
the two forms of power, for this doctrine relies on a false
interpretation of Scripture. Nor, finally, is it true that Con-
stantine could have given the seat of the Empire to Pope
Sylvester, since, his duty commanding him tomaintain hu-
manity in common obedience, it was not at all in his power
to divest himself of that responsibility; meanwhile, for its
part, the Church could not have received anything, insofar
as it had been forbidden from possessing temporal goods.
Throughout all these arguments great pains are taken to
make evident to its full extent the necessary distinction
between the office and its custodian: the latter, as an indi-
vidual, having no right to contradict the authority invested
in him.
But let us leave the list of objections there in order to
highlight two passages in which the philosophical stakes
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of the quarrel are revealed. Dante had suggested that the
defenders in good faith of the Church were as ignorant
in philosophy as they were in theology. He thus ends up
dismantling an argument which is supposedly founded on
Aristotelian principles (III, xii, 1): since all things belong-
ing to the same speciesmust be referred to one thing alone,
which is themeasure of the rest, so the human racemust be
referred to one man alone and, since this man could only
be either Pope or Emperor, it must be concluded that he
be Pope, for no one can argue that there is anybody above
the Pope. In point of fact, let us explain in order to clarify
this statement that Frederick II for his part never dreamt
of subjecting the Pope to his authority. In order to prove
the flawed nature of this logic, Dante introduces a new
distinction between that which comes under the category
of a substance and that which comes under the category of
a relationship. The substance of man, which characterizes
his species, is one thing; quite another is the relation es-
tablished within the species, which characterizes such and
such amode of authority. Both Pope and Emperor are thus
reducible in one sense to themanwho is perfectly man, or,
in Dante’s terms, to the optimus homo, the perfect man. In
a second sense, however, they are defined according to the
relationship which is enshrined in their respective offices
—a relationship which appertains to paternitas for the one
and, for the other, to dominatio (a term which includes
both the idea of absolute power and the idea of the exercise
of government). Thus they are according to one measure
reducible, and by another irreducible, the one to the other.
Any reader tempted to think that this argument is yet
another dictated purely by the requirements of the polemic
would soon be proven wrong. In effect, returning to the
first question, as if that had not already been answered,
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Dante claims that he has only demonstrated that the Em-
peror’s authority does not depend on that of the Pope, but
that he has yet to prove categorically that the Emperor’s
authority derives directly from God. This seems to me to
be a simple pretext for going beyond the limits of his ex-
plicit aim. Effectively, he establishes that humans have a
corruptible and an incorruptible nature, and that, necessar-
ily feeling the effects of these two natures, humans are thus
the only beings to be destined for two ultimate goals: on
the one hand, happiness in this life, which consists in the
exercise of one’s own virtues, both intellectual and moral,
the image of which is given to us by the earthly paradise;
on the other hand, the happiness of eternal life to which
humans can raise themselves only thanks to divine illumin-
ation, through the theological virtues, the image of which
is given to us by the heavenly paradise (III, xvi, 3–7). At
this point, Dante declares that he has finished his task and
has fully answered the threequestions set. Let us say that he
has won the combat, or rather the series of trials by combat
which he had undertaken.
Notwithstanding, the interpretation of Book III runs
into striking difficulties. It is already surprising that the
distinction between corruptible and incorruptible human
nature, linked as it is to the distinction between body and
soul, requires the distinction between two ultimate goals:
happiness on earth, where the human condition is that of
a mortal being, and eternal happiness. In passing, Dante
invokesAristotle,who teaches in the secondbookofOn the
Soul ‘“And it [the soul] alone, being immortal, can be sep-
arated from the corruptible”’ (III, xvi, 4–5). Thus he does
not hide the fact that philosophy already points, without
the help of theology, to the idea of an ultimate goal which is
not temporal.Why then does he deem it useful to specify, a
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few lines further on, that respect for the teachings of philo-
sophy and the practice of moral and intellectual virtues
are only the means of achieving the first goal of humanity,
that which humanity pursues in its capacity as corruptible
beings? Étienne Gilson does not linger on this question,
but he leads us back to it when he endeavours to grasp the
new interpretation of Christianity given by Dante. Gilson
notes that the author of theMonarchia remains entirely in
agreement with Saint Thomas in defining the relationship
between priesthood and Empire; he neither isolates the
two from each other, nor subordinates one to the other.
The first proposition goes without saying; the second is
supported by two references in the text. In effect Dante
writes:
as far as functioning better and more efficaciously
is concerned, [the moon] receives something from
the sun, namely abundant light; having received
this, it operates more efficaciously. Thus I say that
the temporal realmdoes not owe its existence to the
spiritual realm, nor its power (which is its author-
ity), and not even its function in an absolute sense;
but it does receive from it the capacity to operate
more efficaciously through the light of grace which
in heaven and on earth the blessing of the supreme
Pontiff infuses into it. (III, iv, 19–20)
Moreover, Dante grants at the end of the third Book that
the prince owes some submission to the Supreme Pontiff
‘since this earthly happiness is in some sense ordered
towards immortal happiness’ (III, xvi, 17–18). He con-
cludes: ‘Let Caesar therefore show that reverence towards
Peter which a firstborn son should show his father, so that,
illumined by the light of paternal grace, he may the more
effectively light up the world’ (III, xvi, 18). Gilson thus
considers that ‘the influence exerted by the Pope over the
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Emperor is analogous to that of a blessing, i.e. of a form
of grace.’16 Is this simply a concession? The commentator
rejects this suspicion: ‘By reducing the problem of the two
powers to a particular case of the general problemof nature
and grace Dante was, incontestably, locating it in its true
sphere.’17 Thomas remains the authority, since, in his eyes,
‘the peculiar effect of grace is not to vindicate nature or to
suppress it, but to perfect it.’18 In contrast,Dante is deemed
to differentiate himself from Thomas through his wish to
eliminate the principle of subordination, which governs
the relationships between the different spheres, in order
to replace that principle with the principle simply of co-
ordination between the different authorities. For all that,
the conclusion ought not to imply an opposition between
a Christian and a pagan world, but rather ‘two different
dispositions of the Christian world’.19
This thesis is perhaps to be linked to the desire to tone
down Dante’s very evident dualism. Without erasing this
dualism, Gilson reduces its impact by attributing to Dante
the idea of a tripartite authoritywithinwhich each element
would come under a different category. To the Pope and
the Emperor, who, as we have seen, are each put into a
different category of relationship, Gilson adds the optimus
homo, in which they each find, to a certain extent, their
measure. Thus we are presented with a picture which in-
cludes: in the uppermost part,God; in themiddle part, laid
out symmetrically, the category of substance, the category
of the relationship of paternity, and the category of the
relationship of government; then, in the lowest part, the
16 Gilson, Dante the Philosopher, p. 187.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid., p. 188.
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related figures of the Pope, the Emperor, and the perfect
man.20 Finally, having examined the signs of dualism in
Dante, Gilson returns to the theme of a no less funda-
mental trinity:
Nothing could be clearer than the distinction
between these three authorities: philosophy, which
teaches us the whole truth about the natural goal
of man; theology, which alone leads us to our
supernatural goal; finally, political power, which,
holding human greed in check, constrains men, by
the force of the law, to respect the natural truth of
the philosophers and the supernatural truth of the
theologians.21
Now, besides the fact that Dante never at any point
presents the perfect man as an authority, the distinction
established between that which pertains to substance and
that which pertains to relationship prevents him from so
doing: authority can only be understood as relationship.
Kantorowicz, who re-establishes the importance of this
distinction, argues against Gilson that Dante is radically
dualistic. Rightly struck by the extraordinary audacitywith
whichDante devises the idea of happiness in this life andof
an earthly paradise, and likewise the idea that individuals
come into possession of their humanitas by the exercise of
intellectual and moral virtues alone, Kantorowicz sees in
Dante’sMonarchia an attempt to ‘build up a whole sector
of the world which was independent not only of the pope,
but also of the Church and, virtually, even of the Christian
religion’.22
20 Ibid., p. 190.
21 Ibid., p. 196.
22 Kantorowicz,The King’s Two Bodies, p. 457.
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It is true that in certain respects this enterprise was not
new. Dante joins forces, against the group of hierocrats,
known as monists, with the moderate supporters of the
division of temporal and spiritual power, known as dual-
ists, of whom the most eminent in the twelfth century was
Huguccio of Pisa. But Dante goes much further than them
in neglecting the position of the Emperor as a member
of the Church and his submission in religious matters.23
According to Kantorowicz, whose interpretation seems to
me to be wholly convincing, Dante conceives for the first
time of two worlds which are not only distinct but in a
way autonomous — humanitas and christianitas — that
is to say, two models, one centred on the human and the
other on theology. However, the critic here discovers two
versions of the mystical body, that of the Church and that
of Humanity.Thus he substitutes a different picture to that
of Gilson: one in which the Pope and the Emperor are
linked symmetrically to God, because of their authority,
and to Man because of their substance.24 Consequently,
the Emperor bears the marks of the perfect man; the idea
of man, as understood by philosophy, is imprinted in him.
Indeed, what would become of the Emperor if he were not
to spread, by his own work, by his human virtues, philo-
sophical truth?
It is therefore pointless to get caught up in choosing
between aChristian and a paganDante. Hismystical belief
in the One bears the sign of Christian thought, without
him conceding anything to dogma in his conception of
human autonomy. Kantorowicz pushes this interpretation
as far as possible by suggesting that the progression of
the human race towards its perfection coincides with the
23 Ibid., p. 456.
24 Ibid., p. 461 n. 31.
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restoration of the state inwhich the firstman lived, or, to be
more precise, with the reconstitution of the body of Adam
before the Fall. But it is true that, however ingenious this
argument may be, it must again be admitted that nothing
in the text justifies it, and that it is difficult to see why, if
such was his thinking, Dante would have failed to say as
much.Moreover, how arewe to imagine that themoral and
intellectual virtues would suffice to reach the creature who
had still not touched the tree of knowledge? And does not
this supposition also have the problem of conferring a final
theological meaning on the Monarchy?
Perhaps we need to be careful not to want to reduce
all of Dante’s arguments to one common denominator. He
does not suggest that anyone can occupy the place from
which truth would ceaselessly flow. Certainly, notions of
happiness, paradise, the excellence of man, and the perfect
state of the human race all point to the Absolute. But I am
still not certain that we have understood them correctly.
Dante sows doubt when he warns that the literal meaning
can be accompanied by an allegorical meaning, a moral
meaning, and an anagogical meaning (a higher or spiritual
meaning). This understanding of meaning as fourfold re-
mains faithful to the teaching of theologians. However, it
is helpful to see how Dante uses it and how he illustrates it
in the Letter which he addresses to CanGrande dedicating
Paradiso to him. Taking the example of one psalm (113,
v. 1), he proposes the following commentary:
if we consider the letter alone, the thing signified
to us is the going out of the children of Israel from
Egypt in the time of Moses; if the allegory, our
redemption throughChrist is signified; if themoral
sense, the conversion of the soul from the sorrow
andmisery of sin to a state of grace is signified; if the
anagogical, the passing of the sanctified soul from
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the bondage of the corruption of this world to the
liberty of everlasting glory is signified.25
He adds that these last two senses ‘may […] in a general
sense be termed allegorical, inasmuch as they are different
(diversi) from the literal or historical’.26 Clearly, here the
interpretation is applied to the Scripture. ButDantemoves
away from theology when he invites us to read his poetic
oeuvre in the same way as the Bible. In the same letter,
he states that his aim was ‘to remove those living in this
life from a state of misery, and to bring them to a state of
happiness’.27 He offers the following explanation:
The subject, then, of the whole work, taken in the
literal sense only, is the state of souls after death,
pure and simple. For on and about that the argu-
ment of thewholework turns. If, however, thework
be regarded from the allegorical point of view, the
subject is man according as by his merits or de-
merits in the exercise of his free will he is deserving
of reward or punishment by justice.28
Henri de Lubac points out that Boccaccio reiterates the
same attempt at interpretation in his Life of Dante. He also
goes on to quote Coluccio Salutati (the famous humanist,
chancellor of Florence in the last decades of the Trecento),
a great admirer of Dante, who asks his interlocutor:
25 ‘Epistola X: To Can Grande della Scala’, in Dante Alighieri, Epistolae:
The Letters of Dante, ed. and trans. by Paget Toynbee (Oxford: Clar-
endon, 1920), pp. 160–211 (p. 199). [Translator’s note: Lefort cites
the Letter to Can Grande from the passages included in Lubac, Exégèse
médiévale, ii.2, pp. 322–23.]
26 Ibid., p. 199.
27 Ibid., p. 202.
28 Ibid., p. 200.
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Do you not see that sacred literature, the whole
body ofHoly Scripture, is, rightly considered, noth-
ing else in its method of expression than poetry?
For, when we are speaking of God or of incorporeal
beings nothing is literally true, but beneath that sur-
face of fiction there is nothing that is not true. And
what other objection can you have to poetry?What
is there about it that you can find to condemn? If
you object to its method of expression you are be-
yond a doubt condemning sacred literature and the
Holy Scriptures.29
Of course, theMonarchia belongs to a different genre than
poetry, but it would be wrong to want to stick simply to its
literal meaning. Instead, it would be worth examining its
allegorical meaning and, in so doing, we should no longer
worry about the difficulty of reconciling philosophy and
theology.
Ought we not to examine the theme of justice (which
Gilson himself observes is present throughout) and the
significance of the dichotomy between paternity deprived
of power and a government to whom everyone is subjec-
ted? Ought we not also to wonder about the allegorical
meaning of happiness in this life? Dante tells us that we
can reach the latter through philosophical teachings on
condition that we follow these in our works, in accordance
with the moral and intellectual virtues (III, xvi, 8). This
last clarification deserves our attention.The importance of
Aristotle does not make us forget the importance of Virgil,
or of Cicero, nor even the importance of Cato. Similarly,
the full dignity of the human race does not mean that its
29 Coluccio Salutati, ‘Letters in Defence of Liberal Studies’, in Ephraim
Emerton,Humanism andTyranny: Studies in the Italian Trecento (Cam-
bridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1925), pp. 285–377 (p. 316).
[Translator’s note: Lefort cites this passage in French from Lubac, Ex-
égèse médiévale, ii.2, p. 324.]
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final state can be easily defined; perhaps we are to under-
stand that humanity has the power to wrest itself from its
divisions and recognize itself as the same in the variety of
its expressions. Notwithstanding, Dante does not suggest
the image of a world dozing in peace and venerating its
master, but rather that of a universal political society, fully
awake, in which everyone understands their duty. At one
point Gilson writes that ‘Humanity first presented itself to
the European consciousness merely as a secularized imit-
ation of the religious notion of a Church.’30 However, the
term ‘secularization’ lends itself to too many uses.31 In this
case, it hides a fundamental difference between the prin-
ciple of free will and the principle of faith. Kantorowicz
understands the novelty of Dante more clearly when he
highlights that opposition to the papacy and to theChurch
contains at least potentially a breakwith theChristian con-
ception of the human condition. Must we not in effect
agree that the notion of the earthly paradise has not only
an allegorical meaning, but also a polemical import?There
is something provocative inDante’s languagewhich cannot
have escaped his contemporaries.
DANTE AND CIVIC HUMANISM
On every page, theMonarchia bears the marks of medieval
thought. Be that as it may, this observation should not lead
us to neglect all that the text heralds. It is a major source
of modern thought on which the Florentine humanists
were the first to draw, followed by a number of writers
who gained from this first shaking up of Christian polit-
ical theology and ancient political philosophy the power
30 Gilson, Dante the Philosopher, p. 179.
31 [Translator’s note: The French term here is ’laïcisation’.]
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to seek in their turn a new start. Hans Baron — though
we owe to him invaluable information about the influence
exerted by Dante — estimates that it is only at the end
of the Trecento that we find a new understanding of both
history and political life being combined with the studia
humanitatis. The flourishing of what Baron calls ‘civic hu-
manism’ seems to him to be linked to the creation of a
new group of intellectuals rooted in their city — a group
who defended in the same breath the cause of theRepublic
and the ideal of a learned culture, and who condemned
obscurantism as a product of both a period of darkness
and of tyranny. Baron finds only one precedent for this
movement: the spirit of freedom which reigned moment-
arily, around 1300, in Padua, Vicenza, Verona, and Milan,
before being quashed when these communes were subjug-
ated.Throughoutmost of theTrecento, according to Baron,
humanists devoted themselves to purely literary research,
going from court to court without any awareness of their
citizenship.32 For Baron, Dante would be one of these cos-
mopolitan intellectuals, obliged through exile to err across
Italy, except that in his case he made himself a theorist of
Empire. His ideas were soon to belong to a past age; his
uprootedness would condemn him to profess an abstract
form of humanism.
But why then, one wonders, does his influence remain
so acute? Why is the homage paid to him addressed not
only to the poet, to the writer whowas the first tomake the
Tuscan tongue glorious? Why was Coluccio Salutati, the
precursor of new ideas, so interested in him?Was it because
Salutati’s republican convictions were not yet wholly fixed,
as would seem to be suggested by the De Tyranno, written
32 Hans Baron, The Crisis of the Early Italian Renaissance, 2nd, rev. edn
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1966), p. 5.
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at the end of his life and in which the power of one alone is
justified by circumstances? But why does Leonardo Bruni
decide to write in his turn a Life of Dante — that same
Bruni in whom Baron recognizes the purest representat-
ive of civic humanism, he who never ceased praising the
Republic, who defined both the correctly balanced system
of government and the armed citizen, with long-lasting
effects? Why is he so concerned to purge Dante of the sus-
picion of having condemned Brutus? And why does this
same concern recur in the works of humanists in the fol-
lowing two centuries? Why, finally, is the trace of Dante
still perceptible in Machiavelli’s Discourses (at least in the
first Book)? It is true that the latter overturns Dante’s the-
ories, considers the disagreements that Rome experienced
to be beneficial, and judges the government of several to
be superior to the government of one alone. Yet the fact re-
mains that Machiavelli’s allusions to Dante’s opinion must
have been important to his readers.
Whether he inspired praise or refutation, Dante was
never forgotten. And forgotten he could not be, for his
work contained something other than a theory of Em-
pire. He had opened a new field to thought, given form
to humanity, broken the image of cyclical time, bestowed
upon life on earth its dignity, and fully rehabilitated the
part therein of the vita activa, without ceasing to hold the
highest opinion of the vita contemplativa. Finally, he had
conjuredup an idea of the oeuvre—of thework of thought
governed by the demands of beginnings and unveiling —
which was to be essential for all subsequent philosophical
writers. To cite only his great detractor, is it not clear that
Machiavelli paraphrases to a great extent the prologue of
theMonarchia in the preface to hisDiscourses?
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Although owing to the envy inherent in man’s
nature it has always been no less dangerous to
discover new ways and methods than to set off
in search of new seas and unknown lands […],
none the less, impelled by the natural desire I have
always had to labour, regardless of anything, on
that which I believe to be for the common benefit
of all, I have decided to enter upon a new way, as
yet untrodden by anyone else.33
The image of exploration is different, and God is passed
over in silence. However, there is still the same claim of
discovery and innovation, the same expression of a desire
to serve the common good, and the same insistence on the
riskiness of the undertaking.
THE WORK OF THE OEUVRE
We have many reasons to return to Dante’s oeuvre.34 Not
only did it fuel the thinking of Italian humanists from
Petrarch toMachiavelli, but it also spurred the imagination
of princes across modern Europe and equally led to reflec-
tion on the myth of the One. In the sixteenth century, it
was highly attractive to great monarchs, as well as to jur-
ists, theologians, and poets who celebrated their power. It
seems paradoxical that it was at a point when kingdoms
had proved to be the only powerswhich counted, when the
33 Niccolò Machiavelli, The Discourses, ed. by Bernard Crick, trans. by
Leslie J. Walker, rev. by Brian Richardson (London: Penguin, 2013),
p. 97.
34 [Translator’s note:The section heading translates the French ‘le travail
de l’œuvre’, which repeats parts of the title of Lefort’s doctoral thesis on
Machiavelli, Le Travail de l’œuvre Machiavel (Paris: Gallimard, 1972),
partially translated into English as Machiavelli in the Making, trans.
by Michael B. Smith (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press,
2012). ForLefort’s explanationof thismethodological formula, consult
the first part of his treatise: ‘The Question of the Oeuvre’, pp. 3–59.]
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notion of borders had become decisive, and when the new
masters had successfully emancipated themselves from the
oversight of the papacy— some without relinquishing es-
tablished religion, others by supporting the Reformation
— that the idea of a world united under one temporal and
spiritual authority was resurrected and that, at the same
time, Dante’s theories were revived. Now, let us not forget
that it was during this period, in the middle of the cen-
tury, that there appeared theworkwhich contains probably
the most radical criticism of the power of one alone: La
Boétie’s Discourse on Voluntary Servitude. There are many
indications that the author’s target in this text was, beyond
the contemporary theory of monarchy, Dante’s treatise.
What chord had been struck in people’s hearts by this
thinker whom some considered as the last spokesperson
of medieval beliefs, so that, more than two hundred years
after he wrote his work, his ideas should thus continue
to resonate? The effectiveness of the representation of a
dominus mundi, of an emperor heir of Caesar Augustus, is
troubling in Europe at a time when the characteristics of
the nation state are being fully drawn. Moreover, the myth
of the empire will gain new life subsequently in different
forms. Suffice it to mention the ambitions of France under
Napoleon, of Austria or Germany during the nineteenth
century, or even the large-scale colonial projects which
preserve some traces of this myth. Universalist aspirations
and the desire for unlimited expansion are two sides of the
same coin.
It also seems paradoxical that the traces of Dante’s
ideas are still visible in periods when sovereignty has been
detached from the monarch. These traces are discernible
in the theologico-political debates which accompany the
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English Revolution,35 and then the birth of new repub-
lics in America. Moreover, however new the principles to
which the FrenchRevolution claims to adhere, it is notable
that its most famous interpreter, Michelet, offers us some
of themost telling evidence ofDante’s influence.Naturally,
these last few references might cause some surprise. What
would remain— one might well ask— of the fabric of the
treatise, once its principal part, the monarch, has been am-
putated?But I have insisted on the fact that the figure of the
sovereign of the world, as conceived by Dante, is inserted
into a composition all of whose elements are destined to
demonstrate the resplendent virtue of the One. The idea
of the omnipotence of the monarch proves, in effect, to be
closely connected to ideas of justice, peace, and concord,
but also to the idea of a renovatio — of a return to the
perfectmomentwhen the fullness of timemanifested itself
—, to the idea of the legacy of a chosen people, of whom
the double image is provided by the Jewish and the Roman
peoples (is it not written in Convivio IV, v, 6 that the birth
of David coincided with that of Aeneas?), and, finally, to
the idea of a sharing between the destiny of an individual
in search of the salvation of their soul and the destiny of
the human race in search of its unity. Does the recurrence
of these themes, eachofwhichwill be reworked in different
circumstances in different countries, not bear witness to
their affinities and to the formation of one of the templates
of modern politics?
It is true that Dante’s reader seeks first of all to assess
the break that Dante effectuates with important Christian
authors, particularly with the Thomism which had tried
to incorporate Aristotle’s principles. Thus the reader dis-
covers the work which enabled Dante to take advantage of
35 [Translator’s note: i.e. the English Civil War.]
CLAUDE LEFORT 47
both the speculation and the narratives of his predecessors
in order tomake a newoeuvre. At the same time, the reader
notices Dante’s receptiveness to the thought of others and
to the events both of the past and of his time, his ability to
allowhimself to beworkedby everythingwhich came to his
attention. However, it is not only looking back in time, to
the conception of the oeuvre, and seeking to reconstitute
its genesis, which grants access to this oeuvre. Whether
or not the reader realizes it, they are guided by the signs
of its fecundity; they are alerted by the impact that it has
had in the course of a history unimaginable for its author.
This impact highlights particular arguments of whose im-
portance the author was unaware. For example, Bruni or
Machiavelli’s reading encourages us to understand the role
thatDante gave to the citizens of theRoman republic in the
formation of humanity. Or, equally, considering the use
that both princes and political thinkers have, at different
points in time, been able to make of his ideas leads Dante’s
reader to examine the symbol of the One. In short, the
oeuvre continues to reveal itself through the work of time,
in the sense that it shows itself able to summonupbeliefs or
thoughts connected to a new experience of the world and
in the sense that history renders visible everything which
was implicitly brought into play when the text shook up
the traditions and inaugurated a new theologico-political
language. If, then, the birth of the oeuvre bears themark of
time, so too does its fate, although in a different fashion.
The need to understand what Dante meant remains, but
it does not entail disregarding what he announced, since,
all things considered, it is the questions he raised which
matter to us. And these questions are all the more pressing
whenwe find them in transpositions, or even in distortions
of his theory, or better still on examining the criticisms
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which he inspired in thinkers who established a close re-
lationship with him. Let us recall what Dante says in the
Convivio: ‘And all our troubles, if we really search out their
origins, derive in some way from not knowing how to use
time’ (IV, ii, 10).
THE IDEA OF UNIVERSAL MONARCHY IN THE
SIXTEENTH CENTURY
Theessays which Frances Yates has brought together inAs-
traea and which are dedicated to the rebirth of the myth of
the Empire in the sixteenth century help us to understand
what ismeant by ‘how touse time’.36Thishistoriandemon-
strates thatDante’s treatise sheds light on the symbolismof
theEmpire. She does not hide the distancewhich separates
Dante from the propagandists of Charles V, Elizabeth I, or
the kings of France (fromFrancis I toHenry IV). She gives
many examples of the influence that Dante exerted. But it
is sufficient to note the reappearance of the imperial idea
— of a constellation of symbols which were found for the
first time in his oeuvre— to be persuaded that he was not
a dreamer. Rather, he knew how to discover if not, as he
claimed, previously unknown truths, at least signs of the
new legitimacy of political power in Europe. After all, let
us not forget that at that time Philip the Fair was already
rebelling against the pope and claiming to be a very Chris-
tian king in order to affirm the sovereignty of the State and
that, here and there, the phrase rex imperator in suo regno
was being established. From Yates’s enquiry it turns out
that the ideas which Dante had brought together granted
consistency to what we might call a historical imaginary.
36 Frances A. Yates, Astraea: The Imperial Theme in the Sixteenth Century
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975).
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Moreover, those who exploited this set of images, capital-
izing on the events in their own day, notably Charles V and
then Elizabeth I, acted as relays in its dissemination, all the
while obscuring its origin.
The example of Charles V is revealing. We are re-
minded that, as a result of a lucky combination of circum-
stances, his inheritance included on the one hand Spain,
which had recently been unified owing to the union of
Castile and Aragon, in addition to the Kingdom of Sicily,
and on the other hand, a huge expanse of land consisting
of the Duchy of Burgundy, the Netherlands, and Aus-
tria. This seems sufficient to understand his desire to raise
himself above his powerful rivals. But his ambitions were
different in scope. The image which he presents desig-
nates him as the emperor whose portrait Dante had drawn.
He presents himself as an agent of God, tasked with a
universal mission; he claims to reform the Church and
destroy Christianity’s enemies. Frances Yates brings out
convincing signs ofDante’s influence.The ItalianMercurio
Gattinara, close adviser of the monarch and his old tutor,
was a fervent admirer of the Monarchia; we know that he
asked Erasmus — albeit unsuccessfully — to prepare a
new edition of it. Meanwhile, Antonio Guevara, the king’s
historiographer and court preacher, invoked Dante’s argu-
ments in his book, theRelox de principes, ‘whichwaswidely
read all over Europe’.37 One of the references mentioned
by Yates is particularly striking, because it demonstrates
Charles V’s influence in Europe. In his Orlando furioso,
Ariosto has a prophetess announce the unification of the
world under a universal monarch heir to Augustus, Tra-
jan, and Severus. A sovereign stemming from the union
of Austria and Aragon will bring back to earth Astraea–
37 Ibid., p. 22.
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Justice, and all the exiled virtues.38Theprophecy has to do
with both the coming of a new emperor and the discovery
of continents unknown to the Romans. Just as for Dante
the expansion of the empire which led to the census of
humanity coincided with the coming Christ, so too the
discovery of America is the sign of a revelation. Accord-
ing to Yates, this theme reveals the meaning of Charles
V’s famous emblem, which included the two columns of
Hercules accompanied by the motto plus oultre: the new
empire is thus considered to extend beyond the limits of
that of Rome.That this emblem should have fascinated the
monarchs of England and France is a clear indication of
the importance of what I have described as the relaying
of the imperial myth. When she highlights that ‘Charles’s
device was known throughout Europe’ and ‘raised again
the phantom of empire’, Yates sheds new light on the his-
tory of ideas.39 In this history, it is not so much, as I have
said, the references to Dante which matter, but rather the
transformationsof someofhis ideaswhichoccur taking the
framework which he constructed as a starting-point.These
transformations are only comprehensible if we explore in
each case the circumstances in which they were able to
arise and the intentions of the new political players.
The cult of Elizabeth I was partly based on the model
of that of Charles V, although it reactivated the repres-
entations of a universal monarchy for new ends and in
a different national context. Elizabeth benefited from the
renaissance of arts and letters which was fuelled by the
passion for ancient history. At the same time, the establish-
ment of a strongmilitary power and a politics of expansion
were pursued under her rule. It is telling that her glory
38 Ibid., p. 53.
39 Ibid., p. 23.
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reached its apogee, as Yates remarks, at the time of the vic-
tory over the Spanish Armada. This was a highly symbolic
event, not only because it freed England from the threat
hanging over it from its most fearful adversary, but also
because it demonstrated its chosen status in the fight —
Dante would have said, in the trial by combat— for world
empire. The promise contained in this victory responded
in a way to the promise that Spain saw in the discovery
of America: mastery of the seas announced the end of the
earth’s divisions.
In a way, Elizabeth’s prestige came, like that of Charles
V, from the belief that she was born under the sign of
union. She united the two Roses, one the symbol of the
House of Lancaster, the other the symbol of the House of
York, just as the Spanishmonarchbenefited from theunion
of Castile and Aragon.This union seemed to announce the
bringing together of all peoples under her reign. However,
the imperial symbolism is reworked in a particular fash-
ion, since if Elizabeth claimed also to be invested with a
sacredmission, she was able to take advantage of England’s
break with Catholicism in order to give credence to the
myth of ‘a golden age of pure imperial religion’.40 From
this power of incarnating the Reformation, she gains new
credentials for realizing universal monarchy and assuming
the vocation which Dante assigned to his sovereign un-
rivalled on earth. It must be noted that Dante was not a
precursor of Protestantism; Gilson has already denounced
this fiction. Still, the advantages that the Englishmonarchy
derives from the combination of political power and re-
ligion are evident. And it must be admitted that Dante’s
arguments lend themselves to the use to which the English
monarchy was able to put them. The writings of Bishop
40 Ibid., p. 39.
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Jewel, who was familiar with Dante’s work, bear witness to
this use. Jewel accuses the pope of being responsible for
the divisions in Christian society and recalls that Roman
emperors sat on the Church councils in the early days of
Christianity. An even more striking witness is John Foxe’s
book Acts andMonuments, one of the most widely dissem-
inated works in the kingdom, present in most churches,
and which makes Elizabeth an heir of Constantine (who
himself was born of an English mother, in England even).
With Foxe, who cites in his book a whole passage from
Dante’s Monarchia, imperial renaissance and religious re-
formation are elided. Still, it must be remarked that the
Queen’s genealogy is doubled. In addition to the image of
Constantine as ancestor, there is a further imageof aTrojan
ancestor, a relative of Aeneas the founder of Rome, who
supposedly founded London under the name Troynavant,
the new Troy. This legend was no less present than the
first, and is exploited by most of the Elizabethan poets.
Thus we see the Christian and Virgilian traditions being
intertwined in order to justify the election of the emperor
and the emperor’s people.
However, we would not grasp one of the most po-
tent reasons for Elizabeth’s chosenness were we to neglect
her transfiguration into Astraea, the divine Justice whose
presence Dante, as a reader of Virgil, announced alongside
the emperor. It seems that this transfiguration came about
from the start of her reign and provided an inexhaustible
motif in the literature of the period.Themes of theQueen’s
chastity and her birth under the zodiacal sign of the Virgin
were merged with the subject of the reappearance of As-
traea which marks the return of Saturn’s reign, the golden
age. Without wishing to summarize Yates’s argument and
unable to give a sense of the richness of her documentation
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and commentaries (notably those inspired by Spenser’s
Fairy Queen and Shakespeare’s Titus Andronicus), I would
merely like to point out that the two portraits of the em-
peror and of justice are overlain by the portrait of a unique
beingwho is, in this sense,without precedent.Her power is
not only the sign of Astraea’s invisible presence; Elizabeth
is herself Astraea, the incarnation of Astraea. Marvellous
is the condensation of celestial justice and of the monarch
devoted to ruling the universe into one single person. Or
rather, we might also say, marvellous is the doubling of
the sovereign, at once suffused with the whiteness which
— in Dante’s words — ‘does not admit of a more and a
less’ (I, xi, 3) and endowed with the will to command all
human beings. Elizabeth proves herself to be both justice
and judge; she unites heavenly and earthly life. In the series
of figures of the king’s twobodies, so insightfully studiedby
Kantorowicz, she deserves a special place, since, for those
who venerate her, if not for the jurists, her immortality is
almost manifest in her natural body.
Although Yates’s studies contain a wealth of informa-
tion about the French monarchy in the sixteenth century,
notably concerning the staging of ‘royal entrances’ in the
service of the imperial cult, as well as the support that the
Pléiade poets offered to this cult, the case is toowell known
to be worth pausing over. Doubtless, it offers an unusual
version of the rebirth of the Empire, since the sovereign
takes advantage of Charlemagne’s lineage and the miracu-
lous conversion of Clovis. But once more we see belief in
the divine mission of the king, dubbed ‘Most Christian’
(Rex Christianissimus), being interwoven with both the le-
gend of Trojan origins (Francus, son ofHector, playing the
role of an English Brutus) and the legend of the legacy of
Augustus. Born under Francis I, the restorer of the golden
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age, and developed under Charles IX, themyth of the ruler
of the world flourishes under Henry IV. Incarnating the
union of the kingdom and that of the two faiths which
divide the peoples, this last gave rise throughout the whole
of Europe to the hopeof a return ofAstraea (a themewhich
circulated widely), of universal peace, and of the full legit-
imacy of political authority.41
THE TWO IMAGES OF THE NEW POLITICAL BODY
How could the project of universal monarchy formulated
by Dante take shape within the space of a kingdom? This
phenomenon seems less strange, if we consider that the
representation of the One becomes newly effective once it
is supported by the representation of a political body— a
body circumscribed in space yet at the same time amystical
body which, as such, knows no limits.
Let us recall Gilson’s observation: Thomas Aquinas
never mentions the authority of the emperor, and is only
interested in the relationship between the spiritual power
of the pope and the temporal power of kings. Doubtless,
these last seem to him to enjoy relative independence in
the exercise of their government, which stems from the
imperatives of the maintenance of society. They remain,
nonetheless, subordinate to the supreme authority of the
Vicar ofChrist. Are they then sovereigns?Without a doubt,
in the sense that in the domain which they administer, all
human beings, regardless of their rank, must obey their
king so that justice and peacemay reign.The greatest guar-
antee of concord is in the government of a monarch. From
this perspective, Thomism seems to unite the defence of
dogma with realism. The pope’s recognized supremacy
41 Ibid., p. 210.
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does not lead to the fantasy of a theocracy. The recog-
nized autonomy of kings does not mean that they can free
themselves from the supervision of the guardian of divine
law, but rather bears witness to the irreducibility of the
temporal and the spiritual; it seems, moreover, in keeping
with the needs of the time. In fact, the power of a few great
princes proves only liable to rescue people from the arbi-
trary domination of lords, and to procure for the Church
mediators on whom she can rely and who act as obstacles
to the emperor’s ambitions.
Nonetheless, how is it possible to admit the subor-
dination of one sovereignty to another? I will note in
passing that the question is so important as to continue to
be asked subsequently, however different its terms, up to
our own day. Once possessing sovereignty means having
nobody higher than oneself in this world, how is it possible
to conceive of partial sovereignty? From one perspective,
theocracy is an illusion, in the sense that the state of the
world means that it has no chance of being realized and
in the sense that it contradicts the distinction between the
spiritual and the temporal. Yet the fact remains that belief
in the pope’s sovereignty includes the possibility of being
carried awayby the idea of single commandof the universe.
Conversely, the government of a monarch cannot claim to
elude the supervision of the head of the universal Church,
but the office which he fills, and which places him above
all others in his realm and makes him seem a unique being
both in his own eyes and in those of his subjects, includes
the possibility of being carried away by the idea of abso-
lute power. Ultimately, there are no criteria able to decide
definitively between what is temporal and what spiritual.
While Saint Thomas does not mention the role of
the emperor, Dante has hardly any interest in the role of
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kings. His indifference towards the rise to power of a new
type of political player seems to testify to an inability to
decipher the meaning of history which is already being
proclaimed in his day. Should we not, however, consider
that in spite of his error, or perhaps as a result of it, Dante
nonetheless uncovers particular features of the genesis of
modern monarchies? The ambiguity which clings to the
notion of sovereignty in medieval theory is in effect at the
heart of his reflections.He does not deny that there are two
sovereignties, but he conceives of them in such a way that
they belong to two different spheres and cannot encroach
upon each other. Sovereignty is, on the one hand, purely
religious and, on the other, purely political; it resides either
in paternitas or in dominatio. In the political sphere, it is at
once spiritual and temporal; spiritual, since themonarch is
the representative of humanity—ahumanitywhich is part
of God’s creation and has its own end, the actualization of
the intellective power.
Yet the use of the terms spiritual and religious is liable to
bemisunderstood, since the political has a religious as well
as a philosophical meaning. Universal civilitas is religious
in the sense that Christianity is inscribed in social insti-
tutions (an idea which will re-emerge, despite their very
different experience of history, with certain nineteenth-
century thinkers). It is also philosophical since Reason is
supposed to govern all human beings. Now, is not this new
idea of the political a guiding force in the development
of monarchies? In effect, the king only appeared initially
as the primus inter pares, even if he seemed to possess su-
pernatural qualities; he remained caught up in a network
of personal relationships shaped by reciprocal obligations
of protection and fidelity. His authority, in contrast, stops
being relative when it no longer depends principally on the
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allegiance of lords, but instead becomes the guarantor of
the union of a people situated in a defined space and of
their permanence in time.
Examining the conditions of this transformation
would be of little relevance to our argument. Only one
phenomenon calls for our attention: the kingdom is
constituted as a political body by assimilating the symbols
of the Church. Its subjects, whatever their status, appear
as the members of this body; the king, like the head of
the Church, is removed from all the rest and gains the
power to incarnate a community, all the while standing
at its head. From Kantorowicz’s meticulous analysis let us
remember that the political body, although it is organized
as a functional body, comes to be defined as a mystical
body modelled on the mystical body of the Church. The
formation of the State at the end of the Middle Ages has,
then, a dual aspect: on the one hand, the assertion of power
and law over a territory, the delimitation of a political
society between defined borders, and the concentration
of means of power in the hands of the prince; on the other
hand, and in parallel, the conversion of this territory into
a holy land, the transfiguration of the State into a spiritual
entity, and the investing of an originally divine authority
in the person of the king.
We would be unable to comprehend the extent of
this phenomenon were we not to remark that since the
kingdom is conceived as a mystical body and the king as
representing the One, the perspective widens so that the
universe is incorporated into the kingdom and the world
is subjugated by the one who renders the name of the
One resplendent. Doubtless, the desire to conquer and to
extend the limits of the power that has been gained ever
further is not unique to modern princes. Yet it does seem
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as if their ambition takes on a new character as a result of
their identification with a political community. This ob-
servation calls for some commentary. On the one hand,
the kingdom differs from the city in its range and in the
diversity of the forms of organization that it entails, but it
shares some of the characteristics of cities through its co-
hesiveness and the sentiments of all belonging to the same
homeland that it inspires.On the other hand, it differs from
empire because of both the strict delineation of its territ-
ory and the link that it establishes between the sovereign
and the nation, but it shares with empire the notion of a
secular history which includes the Church as an institu-
tion and whose principal concern remains the conquest
of sovereignty over the earth. Finally, if the image of the
kingdom as a mystical body, a body which aims to include
everything within itself, becomes clearer by considering
the model provided by the empire, it is also vital to note
that the Church was itself influenced by the monarchy. It
was in answer to the constitution of the kingdom that the
Church built its domain and tried to root its power in the
world. Its early experience of rivalry with the empire led it
to create a clergy detached from secular hierarchies. How-
ever, the instruments which it gave to its sovereignty, and
thanks to which it gained the cohesiveness of a functional
body, placed it in competition with the new monarchies.
In light of these concomitant developments, Dante’s
work becomes newly significant. Doubtless, Dantewas not
aware of Henry VII’s weakness. For Dante, that Henry
VII bore the title of emperor sufficed to make him ap-
pear the heir of Caesar Augustus and the guide of the
whole of humanity. Dante was equally blind to the fact
that this purported master of the world had to rely on the
ever fragile allegiance of princes and lords whose effective
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power was not dependent on his. He ignored, likewise, the
fact that Henry’s authority was not grounded in a political
community, did not benefit from being identified with a
people, and floated, in a way, above Europe and even above
Italy whichwas the cradle of the empire. In contrast, Dante
was aware of the origins and the evolution of the Church
and understood that pontifical monarchy had been estab-
lished through usurpation and ran into contradiction once
it attempted to appropriate ultimate sovereignty.
He suggests, moreover, a new and fruitful interpreta-
tion of Revelation, according to which Revelation is not
limited to the message of the presence of God in each in-
dividual, but rather offers to humanity the sign both of
its unity and of the meaning of history, a history which is
at once providential and secular. What is thereby brought
to the fore is the universal mission accomplished in the
past by a particular people — on the one hand, the Jew-
ish people obeying God’s commandments; on the other
hand, the Roman people guided by Justice — and their
power to lead humanity towards its ultimate end. Dante
draws out this idea of a chosen people, connected to that
of the progress of the human race towards its perfection,
from knowledge of Scriptures and from the books of clas-
sical writers. Monarchs are likely to seize this idea in order
to establish a connection, in their own time, between the
sovereign, the chosen people, the holy land, and the na-
tion’s genealogy. Dante provides monarchs with a source
of inspiration onwhich they can draw once they think they
possess the means of fulfilling their ambition. Regardless
of the influence of his work, at a minimum it sheds light on
the attempts to restore the empire in the sixteenth century.
Consequently, it is not enough to note the transfigura-
tion of the kingdom into amystical body, the translation of
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the ideal of christianitaswithin its limits.Wemust also con-
sider the relationship established between the notion of a
territory on which the drama of the world is being played
out and a new understanding of time which eludes the
Church. This understanding means conceiving of the sec-
ular history of a people, which leads back to a foundation
as noble as Rome, andwhose events announceworld dom-
ination. Although the myth of empire is fuelled by legends
which glorify the prince, they give a depth and meaning
to time which had previously been hidden by theologians
intent on parsimoniously taking from Antiquity only what
agreed with their teaching. These legends afford the mon-
arch credentials and a sacred function in addition to those
of his divine office and remove him from the jurisdiction of
the pope. At the same time, the nation benefits from being
doubly chosen, since it owes its chosen status both toGod’s
protection and to the succession of princes and genera-
tions which make up its history. The legend, incidentally,
is greatly fuelled by newly gained knowledge of Antiquity;
it is marked by humanist culture, its credibility enhanced
by theorists, poets, and learned artists.
A sign that the cult of monarchy in the sixteenth cen-
tury embodies a new conception of the political can be
found in the persistence of representations associated with
the figure of Elizabeth inEngland into the seventeenth cen-
tury. I have already alluded to this phenomenon. In order
to explore it, it would be necessary to follow the develop-
ment of the belief in the exceptional destiny of the English
people, whose origins, customs, and constant aspirations
seem to demonstrate both that they are God’s creation
and that it was through their own power that they earned
the right to mastery of the universe. I will note only that
during the political and religious conflicts which had per-
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turbed England sinceMary’s reign (under which there was
a return to Catholicism) up until the period following the
Revolution, the same argument is used in different forms.
The nation’s history and the signs of its chosen status make
submission to an institution which claims to be invested in
divine authority difficult.Thosewhoput forward this argu-
ment first of all find that it is subsequently turned against
them. Henry VIII’s proclamation of an empire freed from
any obedience to the Pope had already benefited from a
widely shared belief in their nation’s sovereignty since time
immemorial. Such a conviction persisted amongst radical
puritans who fled their country under Mary so as to pro-
tect their faith.They asserted that the individual was alone
before God, and found in coming together and through
shared discipline the energy to fight against evil in the
world. Nor did they give up on the idea of England’s sacred
mission. These Marian exiles undertook, from Geneva, an
active programme of propaganda against the Church and
the government of the kingdom; they made themselves
agents of God’s law, rejected the legitimacy supposedly
conferred on the institutions in place as a result of their
ancient origins, and went so far as to demand a reform
of the Reformation itself. Such was the strength of their
criticism of the social order and their desire for change that
one historian, Michael Walzer, considers them to be the
first group of revolutionary intellectuals in Europe.42
Nonetheless, as J. G. A. Pocock has convincingly
demonstrated, they never stopped considering themselves
as both saints and English,43 linking their chosen status
42 Michael Walzer, The Revolution of the Saints: A Study in the Origins of
Radical Politics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982).
43 J. G. A. Pocock,TheMachiavellianMoment: Florentine PoliticalThought
and the Atlantic Republican Tradition (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Uni-
versity Press, 1975).
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to the existence of a people chosen by God. Pocock
highlights this ambiguity and points out, besides, that
their apocalyptic vision — which was without precedent
in the other Protestant countries — was connected to
their certainty that the time had come for England to
take charge of the salvation of humanity and assume its
destined role in the drama of sacred history. In addition,
the saints’ beliefs were to contribute to the defence of
temporal power: the Pope appears as an impostor, because
he promotes the belief that Christ remains present in
the sacrament and in the institution of the Church; in
contrast, the secular authority of the monarch has the
merit of preserving the expectation of Christ’s reign. In
a striking turn of phrase that Dante would not, perhaps,
have contradicted, Pocock notes that for the saints ‘The
saeculum was more truly Christian than the false pretense
of eternity maintained by Rome.’44
In this new expression of the critique of religious insti-
tutions, the target was the Church of England in the early
decades of the seventeenth century, accused of having ar-
rogated for itself the prerogatives formerly exercised by the
Roman Catholic Church. In the eyes of a number of purit-
ans, who were loyal to the teachings of John Foxe, Laud’s
episcopacy committed the sin, not of contributing to the
rise of absolutism, but of having contravened the principles
onwhich themonarchywas founded.However, evenmore
significant was the hostility which the saints themselves
encountered. In their turn, they awakened the suspicion
of wanting to suppress the chosen status from which, it
was thought, the Commonwealth alone benefited. Many
movements in the 1650s shared the view not only that no
church, but also that no putative ‘army of God’ had the
44 Pocock,TheMachiavellian Moment, p. 343.
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right to govern public life or encroach upon the domain
which came under the jurisdiction of the nation’s sover-
eignpowers. Suchwas the viewof the Independents,which
also emerges in thewritings ofMilton andHarrington.The
definition, put forward by these two writers, of the citizen
as God’s Englishman is remarkable. So, too, is their fear of
seeing, under thepretext ofwaiting forChrist, the efforts of
the people to create for themselves free institutions be dis-
credited— and, as a consequence, so also is their concern
for the recognition (here I am paraphrasing Pocock) of the
fact that the saeculum, and more precisely the restoration
of a just constitution, is more authentically Christian than
the dream of Christ’s reappearance.
Harrington’s famous book, Oceana, which is a land-
mark in the history of ideas, given the extent of its influence
on eighteenth-century thinkers, reveals most clearly the
intersections between the representations which emerged
during the imperial renaissance and a new conception of
the political.Oceana—which cannot be reduced to a uto-
pia, since its references to the history of England are very
evident — proposes to justify the accession of a new re-
public through an analysis of the combined evolution of
property relations and power relationswithin the kingdom
since the Norman invasion. However, the work connects
the greatness of the Commonwealth to the virtue of its cit-
izens who, like the Romans, enjoy freedom and constitute
an armed people. At the same time, Harrington recognizes
in this Commonwealth a new chosen nation, a new Is-
rael. He deems it destined, like an empire, to unlimited
expansion; finally, he goes so far as to ascribe to it immor-
tality. There is no allusion to Dante, and no sign of his
influence, and yet must it not be admitted that Elizabeth’s
reign, after the reign of Charles V, acted in turn to relay
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the ideas of theMonarchia?Themonarch’s sovereignty has
migrated to the Commonwealth and the theory of the im-
perial republic has come to provide a new version of the
universal city. Now this version in turn proves to be rich
in subsequent developments. In 1776, the Americans will
transform their resistance to the English parliament into
revolution, and will fervently embrace republicanism by
mobilizing all themotifs thatwehave thus far encountered:
motifs of a chosen people, of a dual inheritance of the an-
cient city and of Israel, of a unique moment in which the
history of humanity is revealed, even the motif of a society
which is destined, for the first time, for immortality.
Doubtless, quite different are the principles which
guided those involved in the French Revolution.
The hatred inspired by the Church, as a result of its
connections to political institutions, the destabilizing,
even, of Christianity, over which the Catholic clergy
had managed to preserve their monopoly, were not
conducive to the development of a theory which would
put France under the sign of having been doubly chosen.
The dominant representation of France seems to have
been that of a nation which brings enlightenment to the
world, within which the Revolution marks the advent of a
social order consonant with reason and the restitution to
humanity of its natural right. However, this representation
is far from accounting for the beliefs mobilized by the
break with the monarchy of the Ancien Régime, as is
proved by the debate instituted in the nineteenth century
surrounding the relationship between the Revolution and
Christianity. Here I will pause on the example ofMichelet.
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DANTE AND MICHELET
‘Howwas the task of unfettering humankind accomplished
in Europe?’ asks Michelet in his Introduction to World His-
tory (written in the wake of the July Revolution).45 His
answer is that France is the great author of this work,
whatever the merits of other nations. In order to justify
France’s eminence, he makes use of two images whose im-
portance I have already noted: that of a nation’s organic
unity and that of the nation as amoral person. In France, he
argues, ‘The sign and warrant of a living organism […] is
present here in the highest degree.’46 But soon afterwards
he adds that France has achieved an ‘intimate fusion of
races’ and that this constitutes ‘the very identity of our na-
tion, its personality’.47Moreover,Micheletmore than once
compares the mission that France is henceforth assuming
with that which Rome had in Antiquity.The conclusion to
his work asserts that ‘Rome was the crux of the immense
drama whose peripeteia France directs’.48 In order to char-
acterize Rome, he uses, incidentally, similar metaphors
to those that France inspired: ‘Rome is not an exclusive
world’; ‘She breathes in […] the Latin […] peoples’, then,
when they have become Roman, ‘she breathes them out
into her colonies.’49 He explains: ‘In this fashion she as-
similated the whole world.’50 In another passage, we learn
45 Jules Michelet, ‘Introduction to World History (1831)’, trans. by
Flora Kimmich, in Michelet,On History: Introduction to World History
(1831); Opening Address at the Faculty of Letters, 9 January 1834; Pre-
face to the History of France (1869), trans. by Flora Kimmich, Lionel
Gossman, and Edward K. Kaplan (Cambridge: Open Book Publishers,
2013), pp. 23–118 (p. 37).
46 Ibid., p. 49.
47 Ibid., p. 50.
48 Ibid., p. 63.
49 Ibid., p. 32.
50 Ibid.
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that ‘This magnificent adoption of the peoples long led the
Romans to believe that they had accomplished the great
work of humanity’.51 The belief that is imputed to them is
the belief held by Dante. Michelet contradicts it, for, as he
shows, Rome encountered ‘the barbarians, the Christians,
the slaves [who] were protesting, each in their own way,
that Rome was not the city of the world, and in different
ways they pulled that factitious unity apart’.52
But do we not recognize Dante’s inspiration when —
calling out in his habitual manner to the people who have
rallied to Christianity and have eyes only for heaven —
he exclaims: ‘There you are now, divided into kingdoms,
into monarchies, speaking twenty different tongues. What
about theuniversal anddivine city ofwhichChristian char-
ity gave you a presentiment and which you promised to
realize here on earth?’53 Like Dante, Michelet makes a dis-
tinction between the fate of individuals each attached to
the salvation of their own souls and the fate of human-
ity in search of its identity. Thus he writes: ‘the relation
between God and man was simple then. The relation of
humanity to itself in a divine society, that translation of
heaven to earth, is a complex problemwhose long solution
may last the lifetime of the world.’54 I have not forgotten
that for Dante the solution had been discovered and that
all that was necessary was for the peoples to make it work,
whereas forMichelet, ‘its beauty is in its unfolding, its infin-
ite unfolding.’55 Yet the fact remains that Michelet invokes
a revelationmade to humanity as a whole. He puts forward
this idea at several points. According to Milton, God re-
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid.




vealed himself first to the English; in contrast, Michelet
suggests that humanity has followed a journey with truth
appearing in a fragmentary form, in Asia, then in Europe,
in England, in Germany, and in Italy, up until the moment
France reveals this truth to thewholeworld.Why is France
accorded this privilege? Because France is the nation in
which ‘the social people’ takes form—that is, the people in
whom the different races have come together. As hewrites,
‘Once this order has been felt in the limited society of one’s
own country, the same idea will spread to human society,
to the republic of the world.’56
It would be wrong to think that Michelet neglects the
work ofmight in the establishment of right.He emphasizes
France’s action and describes its ‘love of conquest’, but at
the same timeasserts that it is only ‘Thepretext of ourwars’,
‘For proselytism is the more ardent motive’.57 The French
have the power of universal assimilation, which he defines
as ‘an assimilation of minds, a conquering of wills’, leaving
nodoubt as to the convergence of these two aspects: ‘Every
one of our armies, withdrawing, has left behind a France.’58
Inhiswords, the people of France are ‘the legislative people
of modern times, as Rome was the legislative people of
antiquity’.59 He adds: ‘France acts and reasons, decrees
and does battle; she shakes the world, makes history and
recounts it.’60 It is difficult not to discern the signs of a
religious mission in her past. The idea of the translation
of heaven to earth does not mean that God was a fiction
created by humankind in order to mask their temporary
inability to assume their task down here. If that were the
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid., p. 51.
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid., p. 52.
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case, Michelet would not speak of the unity of humanity
in a divine society. And he would not, at the same time,
declare:
If a social sense is to lead us back to religion, then
the organ of that new revelation, the interpreter
between God and man, should be the most social
of all peoples. The moral world received its Word
in Christianity, the child of Judea and of Greece;
Francewill explain theWordof the socialworld that
we now see beginning.61
Far from breaking with the language of the theologico-
political,Michelet goes so far as to speak of a ‘pontificate of
the new civilization’, which the peoples discern in France,
‘by their silent imitation at least’.62
Michelet will never renounce the idea of France and of
the social peoplewhich he formed in thework of his youth.
Nonetheless, in hisHistory of the French Revolution he will
develop an understanding of the monarchy which breaks
withhis earlier views (largely underGuizot’s influence).To
mymind, it is telling that this change is accompanied by an
explicit reference to Dante. Right at the start of the second
part of his introduction, entitled ‘On the Old Monarchy’,
he writes:
As early as the year 1300, I behold the great
Ghibelin poet, who, in opposition to the pope,
strengthens and exalts to heaven the Colossus of
Caesar. Unity is salvation; one monarch for the
whole earth.Then, blindly following up his austere,
inflexible logic, he lays it down, that the greater
this monarch, the more he becomes omnipotent,
61 Ibid., p. 61. [Translator’s note: Here Lefort actually misquotes
Michelet, replacing ‘l’organe’ with ‘l’origine’.]
62 Ibid., p. 62.
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— the more he becomes a God, the less mankind
must fear the abuse of his power. If he has all, he
desires nought; still less can he envy or hate. He is
perfect, and perfectly, sovereignly just; he governs
infallibly, like the justice of God.
Such is the ground-work of all the theories
which have since been heaped up in support of this
principle: Unity, and the supposed result of unity,
peace. And since then we have hardly ever had any-
thing but wars.
We must dig lower than Dante, and discover
and look into the earth for the deep popular foun-
dation whereon the Colossus was built.63
Michelet continues immediately:
Man needs justice. A captive within the straight
limits of a dogma reposing entirely on the arbitrary
grace ofGod, he thought to save justice in a political
religion, and made unto himself, of a man, aGod of
Justice, hoping that this visible God would preserve
for him the light of equitywhich had been darkened
in the other.64
I needed this long quotation because it calls for some com-
mentary. Michelet finds in Dante’s work the foundation of
all the theories erected in support of national monarchies.
And this foundation is the principle of unity. However,
his criticism implies a self-criticism, since in the Introduc-
tion to World History he attributes to the French monarchy
the merit of having, through its work of levelling out, con-
tributed wonderfully to the formation of the unity of the
people. The signs in this work which I ascribed to Dante’s
63 Jules Michelet,History of the French Revolution, ed. by GordonWright,




inspiration seemed convincing to me. Need I add that in
the pages where Michelet celebrates Italy’s own genius,
Dante is mentioned four times? Michelet’s dialogue with
Dante thus seems to have been carried out over a long
period of time. Finally, I would note that, while Michelet
attributes to Dante the origin of the modern theory of
monarchy, and more generally that of salvation through
unity, he does not break with him. If that had been the
case,whatwould thewords ‘Wemust dig lower thanDante’
mean? Michelet tacitly recognizes that Dante to his credit
sought the means of conceiving Justice on earth, even
though he considers Dante to have missed his aim. As is
very evident, Michelet moves directly from Dante to hu-
mankind: ‘Man needs justice. […] [H]e thought to save
justice in a political religion.’65 In this manner Michelet
suggests that Dante shared a general belief. It was not only
his ‘austere, inflexible logic’,whichhe followed ‘blindly’; he
was also blindly wedded to the collective faith which leads
to investing divine justice in the power of one alone.
Michelet’s attachment to Dante is, moreover, evident
in the text which he places at the start of Book III of his
History (‘On the Method and Spirit of this Book’).66 At
one point, he opposes ‘simple’ and ‘clever’ people, the lat-
ter ‘guileful individuals’ who act like ‘friends of the people’
but who, in fact, despise the people and claim to judge
the Revolution from the heights of their learning. Now, he
grants to those ‘simple’ people illustrious forebears, citing
three names: Dante, Shakespeare, and Luther. He writes
65 Ibid.
66 [Translator’s note: This prefatory text, from the start of volume 2 of
Michelet’s History of the French Revolution, is not included in Cocks’s
translation, and so the subsequent quotations from Michelet in this
paragraph are my own translation. The phrase ‘guileful individuals’
translates the tricky phrase ‘gens d’esprit’.]
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that these three bent down in front of the people, in order
to ‘gather up andwrite their words’. He adds that it was ‘the
people whom Dante came to hear in the marketplace of
Florence’. It is true that ifwe compare these two statements,
it has to be admitted that they are in disagreement. Both
suggest thatDante is a spokesperson for the people, but the
second one argues that the judgement of the people is es-
sentially right, whereas the first indicates that, swept along
by their desire for justice, the people create their own ser-
vitude, and that theGhibelline poet, by echoing this desire,
unintentionally lays the foundations for domination. The
ambiguous nature of Michelet’s relationship with Dante is
connected toMichelet’s own ambiguous relationship with
the people.
If I were interested in Michelet for his own sake, I
could easily demonstrate that, in his History of the Revolu-
tion, neither the acute sense he acquires of the creation
of a political religion under the Ancien Régime, nor his
effort to penetrate the ‘mystery of monarchical incarna-
tion’ make him renounce his religious vision of France’s
role in the history of humanity. He translates the idea of
unity and sovereignty which he pursues in visible things
into the realm of things invisible. For instance, seduced by
Mirabeau’s phrase, he declares that theLaw is the sovereign
of the world. He speaks of the return of Justice, as if she
had fled the earth. He evokes the advent of the royalty
of the spirit, recognizes the Revolution as a new religion,
and describes the revolutionary war as sacred. For him,
the Festival of the Federation is the ‘union of France with
France’, and thismarital union seems to him to be ‘a proph-
etic symbol of the future alliance of nations, of the general
marriage of the world’.67 To all those who witnessed this
67 Ibid., p. 454.
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event, he attributes the following exclamation: ‘“Ah! if I
were one,” says the world; “if I could at length unite my
scattered members, and bring my nations together!”’68 Fi-
nally, bringing together the hope of each individual with
the unity of the human race, he concludes: ‘This ever im-
potent desire both of the world and the human soul, a
nation seemed to be realising at that fugitive hour, playing
that divine comedy of union and concord which we never
behold but in our dreams.’69 Who could doubt but that
Dante’s thought continues to haunt him? The persistence
of that which is ours only in our dreams is for him an in-
dication of the life of the spirit and of the imprint of the
divine in humans. Does not Michelet declare: ‘A strange
vita nuova, one eminently spiritual, and making her whole
Revolution a sort of dream, at one time delightful, at an-
other terrible, is now beginning for France. It knew neither
time nor space.’?70
Michelet seems to me to be an exemplary witness. On
the one hand, he effectuates an extraordinary transposi-
tion of the ideal of the Monarchia by assigning universal
jurisdiction to France and by bestowing religious meaning
on the people and on humanity. On the other hand, he
discovers a political religion which came in answer to the
expectations of the people and was able to keep them for
a long time in servitude. His thinking moves in two direc-
tions which are contrary but not alien to one another. In
the Revolution he finds something other than the trans-
formation of property relations, or the solution to what
others call ‘the social question’. He sees the birth of faith in
humanity, a faithwhichdoes not breakwithGodbutwhich
68 Ibid., p. 456.
69 Ibid. [Lefort’s emphasis].
70 Ibid., p. 444.
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relinquishes the illusion of the impossibility of salvation
on earth and grants to every individual the will to ensure
the spreading of justice by their works. The symbol of the
Revolution, in July 1790, is living: ‘This symbol for man
is man. All the conventional world crumbling to pieces, a
holy respect possesses him for the true image of God.’71
If this is the heart of the matter, Michelet must reject the
idea that, for centuries, people have been subjected to an
external power raining down upon them, or, equally, that
their ordeals were but the result of the painful birth of
the nation. Belief must be the key to the Ancien Régime,
as it is to the Revolution. Michelet has to admit that the
people subjugated themselves by projecting the image of
their unity in a prince and by making of that prince the
sovereign judge. Let us repeat the injunction: we must dig
lower than Dante. Humanity only becomes conscious of its
quest for itself when it has ceased to worship the one in
some other which is separate from all.
DANTE AND LA BOÉTIE
Michelet seems tome to be an exemplary witness, because
his work brings together two contrary inclinations which
had previously appeared to be separate: on the one hand,
the tendency, whether deliberate or not, to use parts of the
picture of theMonarchia to shape events which announce
the conclusion of the drama of humanity; on the other
hand, the habit of taking from this work the principle on
which domination relies and of deriving from the refut-
ation of this principle a new conception of the political.
Michelet’s transformation, however singular, of universal
monarchy into a world republic led by France fits into the
71 Ibid., p. 445.
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pattern that I have sketched out. But it must also be ad-
mitted that Michelet was not the first to consider that the
monarch’s power exerts a force of attraction on his sub-
jects, and that his subjects consent to their subjection.This
idea emerged at a time when Florentine humanists were
defending the republican form of government and seeking
the reasons for the advent of Caesar in the degradation
of the people. It is most fully developed in Étienne de La
Boétie’sDiscourse of Voluntary Servitude. DidMichelet read
this work (reissued by Lammenais in 1835)? Was it this
work that taught him the need to dig lower than Dante?
I cannot guarantee that this is the case, but the image he
puts forward in the phrase over which I paused can already
be found in La Boétie, and I find it difficult to believe that
this is sheer coincidence.At thepointwhen the author calls
on those peoples who are enslaved to a tyrant, he writes:
I do not ask that you place hands upon the tyrant to
topple him over, but simply that you support him
no longer; then you will behold him, like a great
Colossus whose pedestal has been pulled away, fall of
his own weight and break into pieces.72
TheDiscourse was known under the title Against One. This
title is well deserved, even though it was given to the text
by polemicists serving the Reformation. They granted it a
circulation which its author did not desire. We know that
Montaigne liked it so much that he wanted to publish it in
themiddle of his Essais, and that he gave up on this project
precisely for fear of abetting the designs of the Protest-
ants. Montaigne knew his friend better than anyone else.
72 Étienne de La Boétie, Anti-Dictator: The ‘Discours sur la servitude
volontaire’ of Étienne de La Boétie, Rendered into English, trans. byHarry
Kurz (New York: Columbia University Press, 1942), pp. 12–13. [Le-
fort’s emphasis; hereafter cited as Discourse.]
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Moreover, the Memoir on the Pacification of the Troubles,
written a few years after the Discourse, leaves no doubt as
to the intentions of its author; he wanted the Catholic re-
ligion to be stripped of all the pomp contrary to its nature,
but he did not want the king to consent to the coexist-
ence of two equally legitimate religions.73 Nonetheless,
the Discourse is undoubtedly topical, taking this term in
its broadest sense.74 It attacks both the monarchies of its
day and the beliefs which they inspired. There are many
indications which suggest that readingDante shed light for
La Boétie on the origin of the evils of monarchical power,
and that he wanted to overturn Dante’s argument.
The Discourse begins with words from Homer, voiced
byUlysses: ‘No good thing is amultitude of lords; let there
be one lord, one king.’75 It will be recalled that Dante in-
voked this same quotation, placing it under the authority
of Aristotle. La Boétie uses it for a different purpose: ‘he
should have maintained that the rule of several could not
be good since the power of one man alone, as soon as he
acquires the title of master, becomes abusive and unreas-
onable.’76 A few lines later, he rewords his analysis:
Yet, in the light of reason, it is a great misfortune
to be at the beck and call of one master, for it is
impossible to be sure that he is going to be kind,
since it is always in his power to be cruel whenever
he pleases.77
73 See Étienne de La Boétie, Mémoire sur la pacification des troubles, ed.
by Malcolm Smith (Geneva: Droz, 1983).
74 [Translator’s note: The term that Lefort uses here is ‘l’actualité du
Discours’.]
75 Homer, Iliad, i, p. 77 (ii, vv. 204–05).
76 La Boétie, Discourse, p. 39.
77 Ibid., p. 40.
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The emperor’s power is not mentioned, nor is the fact that
people have been ruled by several monarchs. The author’s
target is the master, wherever he appears, for his image
always bears the mark of redoubtable power. La Boétie
names a tyrant whoever holds this power, and there is no
doubt that every monarch is a tyrant. In the course of
his argument, he observes at one point: ‘There are three
kinds of tyrants; some receive their proudposition through
elections by the people, others by force of arms, others by
inheritance.’78Having noted some differences between the
three, he concludes:
still the method of ruling is practically the same;
those who are elected act as if they were breaking
in bullocks; those who are conquerors make the
people their prey; those who are heirs plan to treat
them as if they were their natural slaves.79
The distinction between lawful and unlawful princes thus
proves to bemeaningless. In any case, from the very begin-
ning of the text, the author is careful to point out that his
aim is not to consider, in thewake ofmanyothers, ‘whether
other types of government are preferable to monarchy’.80
He continues:
still I should like to know, before casting doubt
on the place that monarchy should occupy among
commonwealths, whether or not it belongs to such
a group, since it is hard to believe that there is
anything of common wealth in a country where
everything belongs to one master.81
78 Ibid., p. 52.
79 Ibid., p. 53.
80 Ibid., p. 40.
81 Ibid.
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Dante, having stated the subject of his research as polit-
ics, that is, the source and principle of rightful constitu-
tions, immediately transgresses the traditional framework
in order to establish the legitimacy of universal monarchy.
Similarly, La Boétie loses interest in the conventional clas-
sification of different forms of government, but does so,
however, in order to demonstrate the evil hidden in mon-
archy, whatever the form or reach of its jurisdiction. Dante
and La Boétie both get to the heart of the matter, asking:
what is the foundation of the power of one alone?
In Dante’s treatise, the monarch’s power derives dir-
ectly from the position which he occupies, alone above all.
Unlike other authors before him, Dante considers neither
how the monarch should govern, nor his qualities, nor his
education. Once the monarch has no rival, he is thereby
freed from all covetousness, and in a way forced to wish
for what is good. La Boétie is similarly audacious in his
analysis, arguing that such is the position of the monarch
that he is able to be wicked whenever he likes. Dante is
not concerned about cases of bad emperors; the example
of Nero, for instance, has nothing to teach him. La Boétie,
for his part, does note in passing that ‘the inhabitants of
a country’ may happen to confer government on a wise
and valiant man who deserves their esteem and trust, and,
albeit not without some reservation, he concedes that it
would be undesirable to get rid of such a man.82 Yet this
sort of obedience stems, we learn, from the ‘duties of hu-
man relationship’.83 In short, people respond to the good
things they have received with a feeling of gratitude and
veneration. There is no political lesson to be learnt from
this example.
82 Ibid., p. 41.
83 Ibid.
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However, the extent of their opposition to one another
cannot be measured by considering only the way in which
each judges the monarch’s power. If, for Dante, the em-
peror’s power is essentially good, this is because it stems
from the unification of the human race and is, at the same
time, an agent of that unification. The individual has their
own particular goal, as does each family, village, city, and
kingdom; only humanity has its goal in itself. As is evident
in nature, the existence of the whole explains the raison-
d’être of each of its constituent parts. Consideration of the
human body confirms the truth of this principle, since any
organ or limb can only be defined in relation to the task
which it carries out on behalf of the end pursued by ‘the
whole person’. It is this principle of the organic constitu-
tion of human societywhich LaBoétie attacks. In so doing,
there is no better example for La Boétie’s argument than
tyranny, as it is commonly presented. Tyranny proves to
be very revealing. Effectively, since the system of govern-
ment which is considered to be themost corrupt is formed
or maintained by the cooperation of those whom it op-
presses, its power must be driven by a certain charm, that
of the name of the one alone. The first question asked by
La Boétie thus assumes its full meaning in comparison to
Dante’s theory:
For the present I should like merely to understand
how it happens that somanymen, somany villages, so
many cities, somany nations, sometimes suffer under
a single tyrant who has no other power than the
power they give him;who is able to harm themonly
to the extent to which they have the willingness
to bear with him; who could do them absolutely
no injury unless they preferred to put up with him
rather than contradict him. Surely a striking situ-
ation! Yet it is so common that one must grieve
the more and wonder the less at the spectacle of
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a million men serving in wretchedness, their necks
under the yoke, not constrained by a greater multi-
tude than they, but simply, it would seem, delighted
and charmed by the name of one man alone.84
What did Dante, in his day, view as a consequence of the
rejection of the authority of the emperor? The misfortune
of division. La Boétie, meanwhile, lays out the spectacle
of different peoples, each one subject to a tyrant whom
they not only serve but also want to be their master, and
whowill accept any formof suffering rather than raise their
voice against him. They do not give in to his power, nor
are they entranced by his person. La Boétie writes that
people will give up their most precious possessions, their
life even, in order to serve not a Hercules or a Samson, but
rather ‘a single little man’, ‘Too frequently […] the most
cowardly and effeminate in the nation’.85 It is the charm of
the name of the one alone which captivates, and it is this
charm which is to be blamed for the misfortunes of the
times. I noted that according to Dante the trials by combat
fought by claimants to the supremepower inAntiquity had
helped the progress of humanity towards its unity and that
henceforth, this unity having been revealed, the reign of
the emperorwas no longer reliant on conquest; clear assent
to his authority from the peoples sufficed to turn right into
reality. La Boétie, who calls themonarch a tyrant, does not
think that war should be waged against him:
Obviously there is no need of fighting to overcome
this single tyrant, for he is automatically defeated if
the country refuses consent to its ownenslavement:
84 Ibid., pp. 40–41 [Lefort’s emphasis].
85 Ibid., p. 42.
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it is not necessary to deprive him of anything, but
simply to give him nothing.86
According to the author of the Monarchia, consent is all
that is required for the master to become omnipotent; ac-
cording to the author of the Discourse, withholding this
consent is all that is required for the master to forgo his
omnipotence. However effective the emperor’s actions are
deemed to be, for the benefit (argues the former) or mis-
fortune (argues the latter) of all, his authority is above all
symbolic. Thus everything suggests that La Boétie knew
Dante’s argument and understood it very well.
FromDante La Boétie takes the idea that the emperor
makes the name of the one resound in all places and that
humanity in this way understands itself as one. But for La
Boétie, this idea gives credence to an illusion, which is at
the heart of the strange phenomenon that is voluntary ser-
vitude. The name of the one deafens the prince’s subjects
andmakes themmute. If they would rather suffer him than
contradict him, it seems that this is because he rescues
them from the risk of having to understand one another,
of having to talk to one another, of having to experience
ceaselessly the differences between each other. If they give
in to the charm of the name of the one alone, is this not
because uncertainty is inextricable from their condition
of having the gift of language? In fact, there is a moment
when, invoking Nature and the gift of language which she
has given to us, La Boétie seems to reveal his thought most
clearly. In his words, what is most evident is that ‘nature,
handmaiden of God, governess of men, has cast us all in
the samemold in order that wemay behold in one another
86 Ibid., p. 44.
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companions, or rather brothers’.87 Then, having acknow-
ledged that people do not enjoy the same advantages, he
continues:
Hence, since this kind mother has given us the
whole world as a dwelling place, has lodged us in
the same house, has fashioned us according to the
same model so that in beholding one another we
might almost recognize ourselves; since she has
bestowed upon us all the great gift of voice and
speech for fraternal relationship, thus achieving by
the common andmutual statement of our thoughts
a communion of our wills; and since she has tried
in every way to narrow and tighten the bond of our
union and kinship; since she has revealed in every
possiblemanner her intention, not somuch to asso-
ciate us as to make us one organic whole, there can
be no further doubt that we are all naturally free.88
All these fine-tuned turns of phrase deserve to be under-
scored for howwell they bring out the need not to separate
these two ideas: on the one hand, that humans have the
same provenance, are related, and share the same earth; on
the other hand, that they are irreducibly distinct.The same
natural inclination leads them to live together and to live as
individuals.
In this way, the extent to which La Boétie distances
himself from Dante is clear. He suggests that humanity
is one, but that this unity can neither be imagined nor
achieved outside of the ties which people and communi-
ties establish with one other. The visible sign of union is
deceptive: in truth, nature has made us not so much all
87 Ibid., p. 50.
88 Ibid.
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united as all ones.89 However, individuals only discover
themselves as ones through the relationship which they es-
tablish with those with whom they share their life. Accord-
ingly, it is not in the monarch that everyone is reflected;
rather, people recognize themselves as alike by accepting
their differences as they gaze at their reflection in one an-
other. These are not the alternatives described by Dante:
union or division; incorporation into the great whole or
fragmentation. The communion of wills assumes the mu-
tual declaration of thoughts, and not the abdication of
thought in front of him whose will is law. Does La Boétie
not suggest that the charm of one name alone (the author
deliberately does not say the name of one alone) works
because it responds to people’s desire to hear themselves
named and to have the need to name each other assuaged?
And that this namefinally springs up, not fromeach person
taken individually, but rather as a consequence of their
passionate proximity?
Moreover, the Discourse offers the best explanation of
the origin of the charm, when it adds to the power of the
name, which renders the word meaningless, the power of
the image, which makes each person lose the ability to see
that which is before their very eyes. In the passage already
mentioned in which he addresses unhappy peoples, the
author remarks:
Hewho thus domineers over you has only two eyes,
only twohands, only onebody, nomore than is pos-
sessed by the least man among the infinite numbers
dwelling in your cities; he has indeed nothingmore
than the power that you confer upon him to des-
troy you.Where has he acquired enough eyes to spy
89 [Translator’s note: see JudithRevel’s essay in this volume for discussion
of this phrase, which plays on the contrast in the original French
between ‘unis’ and ‘uns’.]
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upon you, if you do not provide them yourselves?
How can he have so many arms to beat you with, if
he does not borrow them from you? The feet that
trample down your cities, where does he get them
if they are not your own? How does he have any
power over you except through you?90
Reading these lines, we once more remember one of
Dante’s key themes. The conception of a body politic
which would be represented by an omnipotent, omni-
scient, and as if omnipresent monarch seems, to La Boétie,
to be the translation of a fantasy. In reality, there are only
bodies which are equally singular and equally limited. And
the fantasy hides a body that is itself also singular, but
which, as a result of this fantasy, gains the power to dom-
inate those who created this fantasy, turning against them
their own sight and strength. This analysis goes quite far
since it encourages the detection of the lie that may be
contained in the slogan ‘to die for one’s country’. In effect,
La Boétie praises the Athenians, the Spartans, and the Ro-
mans who sacrificed their life for their city, but emphasizes
that in so doing they were defending their freedom. In
contrast, the subjects who ‘go bravely to war’ and do not
hesitate to ‘offer [their] own bodies unto death’ have been
carried away by the aforementioned fantasy.91
TheDiscourse goes againstDante and, at the same time,
as I have noted, it also goes against the cult of monarchy in
its own day, especially in France. Its author was a contem-
porary of Guillaume Postel, a celebrated theorist of French
imperial monarchy (Les Raisons de la monarchie [Reasons
for Monarchy] dates from 1551). He was also a contem-
porary of the Pléiade poets, including most notably Du
90 Ibid., p. 46.
91 Ibid.
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Bellay and Ronsard. At one point, La Boétie mentions the
latter with ironical reverence, hinting at the amusement
that the composition of the Franciade provokes in him. He
understands the function of the Trojan myth, and of the
symbols that the humanists took from the ancient world,
but he also appreciates the role played by religion. Having
noted that this last—religion—served the ancient tyrants
as a ‘cloak’, he writes that ‘Our own leaders have employed
in France certain similar devices, such as toads, fleurs-de-
lys, sacred vessels, and standards with flames of gold’.92
Nowhere in his work do we encounter any allusion to the
intervention of providence nor to the theory of a chosen
people. The example of Israel, which gave itself a tyrant
‘without any compulsion or need’,93 distresses him; how
muchmore distressing must he have found the example of
nations who have been subjugated for centuries and who
believe that empire is their vocation.
It remains certain that La Boétie, despite his criti-
cism of its principles, maintained a close connection with
Dante’s political humanism, and that this connection is not
to be found in the zealous advocates of modern monarch-
ies who sought inspiration in Dante’s treatise. The author
of the Discourse seeks in his turn to give to political life
its full dignity, and to decipher the traits of humanitas
in civilitas. This last remark brings me back to Dante. In
my analysis of his treatise, I have tried to bring out its
ambiguity. The sovereign that he imagines undoubtedly
appears to be omnipotent, a fact which justifies the image
of the Colossus before whom everyone bows. However,
the sovereign’s authority is essentially symbolic, and the
human race does not find itself condemned to uniformity
92 Ibid., p. 68.
93 Ibid., p. 53.
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under his reign. Eachpeople ismeant to live in peace, keep-
ing their owncustoms andobeying the lawswhich are right
for them. The Asian or African peoples are no less part of
humanity — without them being expected to convert to
Christianity— than the Romans or the Germans. Neither
La Boétie norMichelet can entirely break free fromDante.
If Dante’s oeuvre helps us to understand the links
which have been established in support of a new idea of
sovereignty, between universalism, imperialism, and na-
tionalism, it also encourages us, if not to undo these links,
at least to disentangle them in order to examine his work,
knowing how to use time.
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